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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

An analysis of cruise tourism in the Caribbean and its
impact on regional destination ports

Degree:

MSc

This dissertation examines cruise tourism in the Caribbean and its impacts on the
Small Island Developing States whose economies are all highly dependent on
foreign injected capital. This dissertation develops profiles for the Caribbean and
cruise operators so as to better understand the context within which this research is
undertaken.

A cost benefit analysis is then done to establish the net impact of cruise tourism to
the region. In that regard, an analysis is performed to determine the economic,
environmental, security and social impacts of the industry on regional destination
ports. Additionally, for islands with multipurpose berths, a further analysis is done to
examine the impact of cruise tourism on the operations of liner shipping.

Noting the high level of concentration in the industry as well as the trend of cruise
operators to build mega cruise vessels a further examination is done to ascertain the
capacity of destination ports to accommodate such vessels and the balance of
power between cruise operators and destination ports.

The dissertation concludes by acknowledging the positive impacts of cruise tourism
but notes that this may easily be offset by the negative impacts of environmental
degradation and the short-sightedness and lack of co-operation among destination
ports. From the conclusions, five recommendations are thus made to develop the
cruise tourism in the Caribbean in a sustainable manner where all major players can
benefit in this collaborative effort.

KEYWORDS: Caribbean, Concentration, Cruise Operators, Balance of Power,
Destination Ports, Highly dependent, Lack of Co-operation, Sustainable Tourism
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1.1

Introduction

Background Information

The Caribbean is the world’s leading cruise destination. Its geographical location in
a warm temperate zone, its strategic position relative to the US and its rich and
diverse cultural heritage, makes it a must for any vacationer.

These islands are, however, all considered to be small island developing states, with
fragile economies and ecosystems which make them very vulnerable to socioeconomic and political developments in the world. Though, their natural resources
can easily be adversely affected by environmentally degradation, the trend of cruise
operators to design and market their vessels to compete directly with land-based
resorts, appears to have gone by unnoticed. The magnitude of waste generated on
a daily basis by mega-cruise ships, the high levels of congestion at heritage sites,
the potential health hazards associated with gases such as nitrogen oxides (NOx),
sulphur oxides (SOx), and carbon dioxide (CO2) found in the exhausts of marine
diesel engines, are hardly ever considered by destination ports.

Strangely enough, even when faced with falling market shares, destination ports in
the Caribbean continue to invest in their port infrastructures as well as the
development and enhancement of shore attractions.

Tourism is a major GDP

contributor for economies of destination ports. In recent times, cruise tourism, has
gained increasingly more importance than land-based resorts.

1

Interestingly to note, are the demands that are sometimes made by cruise operators
on destination ports, and the corresponding threats to remove destination ports from
itineraries, if a desired action is not undertaken.
1.2

Significance of the study

It is hoped that this research will help clarify the possible reasons why scant regard
is given to the environmental impact of cruise tourism in the Caribbean. Also, an
explanation, into why destination ports seldom co-operate when it comes to matters
related to cruise tourism, as well as, possible reasons why cruise operators in the
region appear to have relatively more negotiating power than destinations ports.

The results of this research, though representing just the tip of an ice berg, should
be used to formulate, develop and implement strategies to ensure the sustainability
of the cruise tourism industry in the Caribbean.

1.3

Research Objectives

In seeking to perform an analysis of the above issues and to better understand the
impact of cruise tourism on destination ports; this dissertation has the following
objectives which serve as a guide to the research:
1. To determine and evaluate the economic impact of cruise tourism in the
Caribbean;
2. To ascertain the balance of power between cruise operators and destination
ports;
3. To evaluate the capacity of destination ports to accommodate future megasized cruise vessels;
4. To determine the economic and operational implications to liner shipping, of
the priority berthing given to cruise vessels;
5. To assess the ability of destination ports to meet their obligations as
mandated by MARPOL 73/78 and provide port reception facilities for shipgenerated wastes?
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1.4

Scope of the study

This study, whilst analysing cruise tourism throughout the Caribbean is primarily
geared towards the islands of CARICOM that are engaged in cruise tourism.
Contrary to the customary method of researching a sample then making
generalisations about the population, this study does the opposite. Cruise tourism is
researched in the context of the Wider Caribbean (the population) and the results
are used to reinforce conclusions of a sample, which in this case, are the destination
ports of CARICOM. Likewise, recommendations are developed specifically for
CARICOM destination ports.
1.5

Research Methodology

Exploratory research was undertaken to determine the availability, content and
relevance of data to the key issues emphasised in the objectives of this dissertation.
Extensive use was therefore made of the books, journals, periodicals, articles,
acquired from the library at the World Maritime University. Additionally, reference
material was acquired from the Saint Lucia Air & Sea Ports Authority, was also used
to gain insights into the operations and inter-relationships between cruise operators
and destination ports, and among destination ports. Extensive use was also made
of internet sources to build upon the information gained from secondary research.

To verify and check reliability of port info and to determine if any developments had
taken place subsequent to that obtained in secondary sources, questionnaires were
sent to thirty three stakeholders in the industry. The response rate was so dismal
that the author had to resort to making telephone calls, to several Caribbean
destinations, where personal interviews were conducted with Marine Pilots and
other key port officials involved in the cruise sector.

Chapter 2 gives a regional profile of the Caribbean. Factors which have made the
Caribbean the most sought-after cruise destination are examined and the region
divided into five segments. The respective market shares and islands within the
segments are identified.
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Chapter 3 introduces the major cruise operators within the region and gives a useful
insight into the market shares and representative agencies of Carnival Corporation
& plc, Royal Caribbean Cruise Limited and the Star Group. An analysis is performed
on their financial statements which were obtained through secondary research.

Chapter 4, through a cost benefit analysis, evaluates the direct and indirect impacts
of cruise tourism and compares it with impacts generated by air pollution, shipgenerated wastes, absence of port reception facilities, social and security impacts
as well as the economic and operational impact on liner shipping caused by the
priority berthing given to cruise vessels.

Chapter 5 evaluates the capacity of destination ports to accommodate very large
cruise vessels. In this chapter, greater emphasis was placed primary research and
the relevant information was acquired from marine pilots and other senior port
officials in the various destination ports. The balance of power between cruise
operators and destination ports were examined in the context of the level of
concentration among cruise operators, the substitutability of destination ports,
market representation, level of co-operation between destination ports, the
dependency of destination ports on cruise tourism.

Chapter 6 gives a strategic analysis of cruise operators and destination ports whilst
Chapter 7 draws conclusions and proposes recommendations for a more equitable
and sustainable tourism industry in the Caribbean.
1.6

Limitations of study

In this research, only the major cruise operators with brands promoting mass
tourism were considered. Recognition is given to upcoming leader MSC Cruises and
the fact that alongside the mega lines operate smaller vessels which may make a
more meaningful contribution to destinations ports than mega cruise vessels.

Substantial evidence was made available courtesy of Teri Shore, of Friends of the
Earth International, showing where cruise vessels admitted to dumping waste in the

4

Caribbean. However, it was very difficult to determine if the waste was processed as
per industry standards or if innovative devices such as Marine Sanitation Devices
(MSDs) Type II or Advanced Wastewater Purification Systems (AWPSs) were
operating as they should. Efforts to obtain further information from the Caribbean
Environmental Health Institute (CEHI) were futile. CEHI, established by CARICOM
in 1988, and with responsibilities for environmental impact assessment and
environmental health information, had never done any studies on the environmental
impacts of cruise tourism. Lastly, great difficulty was encountered in obtaining
feedback from a number of cruise lines. This made it impossible to do a more
comprehensive analysis on the financial standing of cruise operators since no
industry bench marks were available for comparison purposes with their respective
financial ratios.

5

2

2.1

The Caribbean-a regional profile

Historical Profile

The history of the Caribbean has been one shaped largely by the migration of
people into the region from South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the
colonisation by the Spain, England, France, Holland, Denmark and Swedish to a
lesser extent.

The first inhabitants of the Caribbean were the Caribs and Arawaks, Amerindians
who migrated from South America and who were mistakenly taken for Indians by
Columbus. Thinking that he had arrived in India, he erroneously proceeded to call
the region the West Indies, and notwithstanding that the islands were already
inhabited, claimed a number of islands in the name of King Ferdinand and Queen
Isabella of Spain.

The Spanish occupation of the Caribbean resulted in the enslavement of indigenous
races in gold mines and agricultural estates. After their eventual decline and demise,
they were replaced in 1501 by Negro slaves, first from Spain and then West Africa.
The dominance of Spain in the Caribbean is adequately explained by Williams (1970)
who stated that political climate in the fifteenth century was one which was
congenial to discovery and overseas expansion. The presence of gold, sugar and
slaves in the Caribbean represented an enormous accession of wealth and power.
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Spanish dominance in the region remained largely unchallenged until the early 16th
century when Spain’s enemies in Europe, the colonial powers of the British, French
and Dutch began to question that very dominance. One such person was Francis І,
King of France who minced no words in voicing his protest when he said, “The sun
shines for me as well as others. I should very much like to see the clause in Adam’s
will that excludes me from a share of the world! God did not create these lands for
Spaniards alone” (Williams, 1970, pp. 71-72).

During the mid-1500s and mid-1600s they succeeded in eroding Spain’s supremacy
and went as far as encouraging and authorizing their citizens to attack Spanish
merchant ships, fleets and ports (http://encarta.msn.com). Contrary to today, where
the International Maritime Organization, with the backing of its member states have
enacted resolutions to curb the illegal and often destructive act of piracy, Williams
(1970) reports that the piracy during that period had the backing of colonial powers
and had essentially become a feature of the national policy of Spain’s enemies in
Europe.
The 18th and 19th centuries were of particular significance to the Caribbean for it was
a period where occurrences during that time had long lasting effects and played a
critical role in shaping the region’s history. Such occurrences include but are not
limited to: the intensive rivalry between the British and French for regional
supremacy; the introduction of sugar cane, the profitability of which resulted in all
available lands being utilized for its cultivation and thus the preference to its
exportation and the importation of food; the abolition of the negro slave trade in
1807; the commencement of migration into the Caribbean by Indians in 1838,
Chinese in 1859, and Japanese in 1894; and the Spanish-American War of 1898
which put an official end to Spanish power in the Caribbean (Williams, 1970).
2.2

Regional Resources

Until the mid-20th century many Caribbean Islands, with the possible exception of
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, relied heavily on their agricultural sectors for
economic growth and sustainability (http://encarta.msn.com). With globalisation and
its accompanying trade liberalisation, between nations and within economic blocks,
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the guaranteed market given to the agricultural products of many islands were
adversely affected. 1 As a result, these islands diversified into tourism and relied less
on the dwindling returns of their agricultural produce. Even Trinidad, with its
petroleum, asphalt and natural gas and Jamaica with its supplies of iron ore and
bauxite have followed suit and diversified into tourism as well.
In that regard, the term regional resources refer to all types of resources used for the
promotion and development of the tourist industry and particularly, cruise tourism.
Such resources would include attributes derived from being located in a warm
temperate zone with breathtaking coral reefs, lush vegetation, spectacular beaches,
clear blue seas, volcanic remains, rugged mountains and indigenous species of birds,
reptiles and marine life. The islands, which were formed by partially submerged
mountain ranges, volcanic activity and some from coral, which emerged from the
ocean (http://encarta.msn.com), lie in close proximity to each other and are
affectionately considered by many, as a tropical paradise with sunshine all year
round. According to Moonie et al (1998, p. 153) one of the strong points of the
Caribbean is the large number of accessible islands, which allows cruise ships to
offer their passengers “port-a-day” cruises without having to travel at high speeds to
arrive at the next port of call.

In terms of institutional resources, the Caribbean Community and Common Market
(CARICOM) is the most notable and recognized in the region. Comprising of 13
Member States and 5 Associated Members, the political leadership of CARICOM, in
the aftermath of September 11, 2001 2 joined forces with regional and international
tourism bodies to develop an emergency response to save from ruin, the Caribbean’s
most vital economic sector, the tourism industry. On 1 January 2006, the CARICOM
Single Market and Economy (CSME) was established thus enabling member states
to benefit from greater negotiating power, pooled resources, improved ability to
recruit skilled workers, source inputs from resource rich locations, and achieve

1

World Trade Organization ruling against the preferential treatment given to Caribbean bananas on
the European Market resulted in the loss of jobs to many farmers who could not compete with US
(Chiquita) owned farms in Latin America.
2
This date signifies the launching of deadly and devastating attacks on New York City, and
Washington, D.C., USA
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greater

economies

of

scale

thus

enhancing

its

external

competitiveness

(www.caricom.org).
2.3

Political Climate

The islands of the Caribbean are very politically diverse as a direct consequence of
their colonial history. Williams (1970, p. 70) posit the view that the Caribbean’s
history was conceived in international rivalry which was reared and nurtured in an
environment of power politics.

It would hardly be surprising, therefore, if one

expects the political climate in the region to be one of instability, characterized by
turmoil and an environment, which is not conducive to business, especially that of
cruise tourism.

On the contrary, when one thinks of the Caribbean, the first thing which comes to
mind is an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity. Although the region comprises 13
independent nations and a number of dependencies, territories, and possessions of
France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, and Venezuela
(http://encarta.msn.com), they all coexist in warm and cordial relations between and
within their respective boundaries, worlds away from political instability and its
associated ills.

Even within the confines of CARICOM political fragmentation exists. However, as
illustrated by Hanratty (1989), most islands inherited strong democratic traditions
and parliamentary systems of government that were patterned after the Westminster
model. Furthermore, to ensure that democracy and political stability were
entrenched in the region, CARICOM, at its 10th Conference of Heads of Government
agreed to the establishment of the Assembly of Caribbean Community
Parliamentarians (ACCP). This effectively gave the parliamentary opposition in the
respective islands, an opportunity to make their contribution to the Community’s
decision making process (www.caricom.org). Additionally, Caribbean leaders have
expressed great opposition to the establishment of a regional defence force on the
premise that such a force might eventually threaten the very democracy it was
established to protect (Hanratty, 1989).
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2.4

Home and Destination Ports

There are basically two types of cruise ports, which Canamero (2005) identified as
Base or Home Ports and Way or Destination Ports. Home ports are the beginning
and termination nodes of a cruise and provide key logistical services to cruise
vessels, their passengers and crews. They are often regarded as one of the key
players in the cruise industry.

Conversely, destination ports are more oriented

towards the provision of tourist attractions and would plan and coordinate a variety
of excursions to coincide with the vessels’ stay in port.
Monie et al (1998, pp.177-181) identified two categories of port selection criteria
(Table 1) used in the Caribbean to determine whether a destination should be
included on a ship’s itinerary. These attributes, when combined with the destinations
image, form what is referred to as the intrinsic value of the destination.

They,

however, emphasize that having a high intrinsic value does not necessarily mean
the automatic selection of a port, especially if the location of that port does not allow
it to be visited within the time constrains of the cruise.

Table 1: Port selection criteria
Port-related attributes

Island-related attributes

AA
AB
AC
AD

BA
BB
BC

beaches and water sports
cultural diversity
popularity of the destination

BJ
BK
BL

special attractions
sports facilities
tourist information

AE
AF
AG
AH

accessibility of the port
berth availability
berthing facilities
passenger reception
facilities
ports dues/head taxes
reliability of sailing schedule
smooth immigration process
tender service

BD
BE
BF
BG
BH

friendliness of locals
local transport
political stability
restaurants/bars
shopping

BM
BN
BO

tourist safety
uniqueness
weather conditions

AI

vessel security

BI

shore excursions

Source: Monie et al, 1998, p178.

Conversely, when it comes to home-port selection, the port-related attributes in
Table 1 are of equal importance. This is because of the ever increasing size of
cruise vessels, security considerations and the expressed need of cruise lines to
control their costs.

However, as a result of the array of logistical activities

undertaken at home ports, other factors must also be given consideration. Such
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factors include the availability and cost effectiveness of airlift, vessel support and
provisioning

facilities,

availability

of

hotel

accommodation,

efficiency

and

effectiveness of transferring large numbers of cruise passengers between air and
cruise terminals, and crew recreational facilities (Monie, Hendrickx, Joos, Couvreur,
& Peeters, 1998).

The major home ports for the Caribbean are Miami, Port Canaveral, and Port
Everglades/Fort Lauderdale on the Florida coast and the port of San Juan, Puerto
Rico 3 located in the Caribbean (G. P. Wild Limited, 2006, p. 57). Coincidentally, the
Florida home ports are ranked among the top five cruise destinations in the world,
with Miami and Port Everglades being ranked as number 1 and 2 respectively, and
Port Canaveral as number 4 Wild & Dearing (as cited in Gibson, 2006).

Prior to 9/11, in order of priority, the top four preferred destinations in the Caribbean
as illustrated in Figure 1 were the Bahamas (23%), St. Thomas (20%), Puerto Rico
(14%), and Cozumel (13%). This point is substantiated by Monie et al (1998, p.155)
who indicated that in 1996, the four leading destinations were the Bahamas, the US
Virgin Islands (mainly St. Thomas), Cozumel (Mexico), and Puerto Rico (mainly San
Juan).
St. Thomas
(USVI)
20%

Bahamas
23%
Cayman
Islands
11%

St. Marteen
10%
Puerto Rico
14%

Jamaica
9%

Cozumel
13%

Figure 1: Compound Share of Caribbean Market from 1990-1999
Source: Own compilation from Wild, 2006, p80 & WTO, 2003, p142

The fear of flying in the aftermath of 9/11 and the expressed desire of North
American passengers to cruise closer to home resulted in the establishment of
several homeports along the US Gulf Coast. This had the dual effect of reducing
the market share of major home ports of Miami, Port Everglades, and Port

3

Puerto Rico, the fourth largest of the Caribbean archipelago, is a U.S. commonwealth
(http://encarta.msn.com)
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Canaveral and gave cruise operators the opportunity to develop new cruise
itineraries in the Western Caribbean (G. P. Wild Limited, 2006; Peisley, 2006).
The total number of passengers visiting the islands in Figure 1 from 1990 to 1999
(47.4 million) increased by over 10 million for the period 2000 to 2004 (57.6million).
Figure 2 illustrates a movement away from the traditional destinations of Puerto Rico
and St. Thomas, whose shares decreased by three and four percentage points
respectively, in favour of Cozumel, which as a direct impact of 9/11, experienced an
increase of six percentage points. The growth of Cozumel is positively correlated to
the increased home-porting at the Gulf ports (G. P. Wild Limited, 2006).
St. Thomas
(USVI)
16%

St. Marteen
9%

Bahamas
25%

Puerto Rico
11%
Cozumel
19%

Jamaica
8%

Cayman
Islands
12%

Figure 2 Share of Caribbean Market from 2000-2004
Source: Own compilation from Wild, 2006, p80 & WTO, 2003, p142

2.5

Market Segmentation

Monie et al (1998) divided the Caribbean into four segments: the Western, Eastern,
Southern and the Deep Caribbean. They included the Bahamas as a fifth segment
due to their importance and proximity to the Caribbean market. It must be noted,
that the Bahamas have a much closer relationship with the Caribbean than mere
proximity to the region and actually became a Member State 4 of CARICOM on 4th
July 1983 (www.caricom.org).

4

The Bahamas is a member of the Caribbean Community but not the Common Market

12

Table 2 Geographic segmentation of the Bahamas and Caribbean cruise market
Western
Caribbean

Bahamas
Freeport
Nassau
Coco Cay *
Pleasure Is*.
Princess Cays*
Royal Isle*

Eastern Caribbean

Cayman Islands
Cancun
Cozumel
Jamaica
Key West,
(Cuba)

Antigua, British Virgin
Islands, San Juan,
Saba, St. Barts, St. John,
St.Kitts & Nevis, St. Maarten,
St. Thomas, Virgin Gorda,
Labadee*, and Serena Cays*

Southern
Caribbean

Deep Caribbean

Barbados
Dominica
Guadeloupe
Martinique
St. Lucia,
St. Vincent
Princess Bay*

Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao,
Cartagena, Grenada,
Isla de Margarita,
La Guaira,
Panama Canal, Puerto,
Cabello, and Trinidad &
Tobago

San Juan,
Miami,
and, Barbados

San Juan, Aruba, and
Montego Bay

Home Ports
Miami

Miami, Montego
Bay, and Tampa

1-day
3-days
4-days

Miami and San Juan
Cruise Duration
7-days
10-days
11-days

4-days
7-days

7-days
10-days
11-days

7-days
10-days
11-days

* Private out-Island
Source: Monie et al, 1998, p161, (Original source: William S.A. Da Costa Gomez, prepared for the Sint Maarten
Port N.V., Sint Maarten Cruise Tourism Action Strategy. P.15)

Deep
Caribbean
9%

Southern
Caribbean
15%

Baham as
21%

W estern
Caribbean
19%

Eastern
Caribbean
36%

Figure 3 Market Share of the Bahamas and Caribbean Cruise Market from 1986-1996
Source: Monie et al, 1998, p174

During the period 1986 to 1996, as is depicted in Figure 3, the Eastern Caribbean
was the preferred Caribbean destination followed at a considerable distance by the
Bahamas, Western, Southern and Deep Caribbean respectively. Collectively, during
that period, the Deep, Southern, and Eastern Caribbean represented the largest
market share of cruise passengers.

Southern
Caribbean
22%

Deep
Caribbean
8%

Bahamas
13%
W estern
Caribbean
26%

Eastern
Caribbean
31%
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Figure 4 Market forecast of the Bahamas and Caribbean Cruise Market from 1997-2004
Source: Monie et al, 1998, p174

Figure 4, when compared to Figure 3, shows the Western and Southern Caribbean
segments experiencing significant growth at the expense of the Bahamas and
Eastern Caribbean destinations.

The possible reasons for these developments

according to Monie et al (1998) were hurricane damage to Eastern Caribbean ports,
which would increase market share in the Southern Caribbean from 15% to 22%,
request for new itineraries by repeat passengers, and a high-profile marketing
campaign currently being undertaken by the western port of Cozumel. Additionally,
according to Monie et al (1998) the creation of a 4-day Western Caribbean itinerary
would have profoundly affected the Bahamas and result in a drop of market share
from 21% to 13% as illustrated in Figure 4.
Southern
Caribbean
9%

Deep
Caribbean
7%

Bahamas
18%

W estern
Caribbean
30%

Eastern
Caribbean
36%

Figure 5: Market Share of the Bahamas and Caribbean Market from 1997-2004
Source: Own compilation from Wild, 2006, p80 & WTO, 2003, p142

There is no way 9/11 or its impact on the cruise industry could have ever been
foreseen.

Fear of flying adversely affected San Juan as a home port and, as

depicted in Figure 5, consequently led to the erosion of the Bahamas, Southern and
Deep Caribbean’s market share in favour of the Western Caribbean ports, which
were regarded as the most convenient cruise destinations. The most noticeable
change was the fall in the Southern Caribbean’s market share by 6% rather the
forecasted increase of 7% shown in Figure 4.
2.6

World Ranking

From its discovery during the colonial era; as a generator of economic wealth to its
colonial masters, to its rediscovery during the 20th and 21st centuries as a tropical
paradise, the Caribbean has always been the world’s most sought after destination.
The modern concept of the cruise grew up around Miami as a base port, North
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American passengers and the islands of the Caribbean as destination ports. Since
that time, the Caribbean has maintained its position as the most preferred
destination in the world, and is seen to have consolidated that rank (Figure 6) in the
years following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 on New York City
(Gibson, 2006; Monie, Hendrickx, Joos, Couvreur, & Peeters, 1998; Peisley, 2006;

Market share (%)

Wilmsmeier, 2006; WTO, 2003)
54.0
52.0
50.0
48.0
46.0
44.0
42.0
1987

1995

1998

2000

2005

2006

Year

Figure 6 Combined World Cruise Tourism Market share of the Bahamas and the Caribbean.
Source: own figure based on data from study WTO 2003 p. 134, Monie et al, 1998, p, www.f-cca.com

Prior to 2001, as illustrated in Figure 6, the Caribbean gradually began losing its
market share of the world total cruise market and experienced a reduction from
52.7% in 1987 to 45.8% in 2000. Some of the reasons for this decline have been
attributed to the transfer of the Caribbean cruise experience to other world locations,
changing demography and tastes of cruise passengers, and the wearing off of the
region’s novelty. This downward trend was however reversed in the aftermath of
9/11, but as Americans slowly began to recover from that traumatic event, the
gradual loss of market share continued, as is evident in 2006.
2.7

Chapter Analysis

The islands of the Caribbean have been very successful, not only in making the
transition from agricultural to tourism-based economies, but also in ensuring that the
region’s intrinsic value was sufficiently high to keep it as the world’s premiere cruise
destination.

The globalization of the Caribbean cruise experience as well as the changing
demography of passengers has from 1987 resulted in the steady decline of the
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Caribbean’s market share and had it not been for the events surrounding 9/11 would
probably have had a smaller market than what exists today.

Terrorism, and in particular acts of terror against the United States, have had
adverse and contractive effects on the cruise industry. Though the Western Segment
of the region appears to have benefited from 9/11 (Figure 5), this event has had the
following effect: it has driven cruise operators to realise the high risks associated with
depending too heavily on the North American market 5 and as a means of risk
minimization, they have intensified efforts to diversify their destinations by working
towards the continued globalisation of the North American cruise experience (WTO,
2003). This development, as well as the fading novelty of the region, will see the
continued erosion of its market share irrespective of the gains made after 9/11.

5

In 2000, North Americans accounted for 2/3 of world cruise demand (WTO, 2003).
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3

3.1

International Cruise Operators

Operator Profile

The main drivers behind cruise tourism are the cruise operators and in the
Caribbean as well as worldwide, the major operators are Carnival Corporation & Plc,
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd, and the Star Group.

Carnival Corporation was initially launched as Carnival Cruise Lines in 1972 and
became a public company in 1987. It is the world’s largest cruise company and is
well-known for its multi-brand approach for serving its diverse markets. It is the
parent company of AIDA Cruises, Carnival Cruise Lines, Costa Cruises, Cunard
Line, Holland America Line, Ocean Village, P&O Cruises, Princess Cruises, P&O
Cruises Australia, Seabourn Cruise Line, Swan Hellenic, and Windstar Cruises 6 .

Other Europe
12%
Germany
4%

Australia
3%

UK
9%
North America
72%

Figure 7 Geographic Distribution of Carnival Corporation & plc – end 2005
Source: (G. P. Wild Limited, 2006, p. 87)

6

In 2006, Windstar Cruises was sold to Ambassadores International Inc. for US$100 million
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Figure 7 reveals that Carnival operates on a global scale with 72 percent of its
business based in North America, 25 percent in Europe and 3 percent in Australia.
The globalization of the company’s operations was enhanced when it acquired P&O
Princess Cruises in 2003; a strategic move which assisted the company in
diversifying its risk and relying less on the North American market. The effectiveness
of this diversification strategy is illustrated by the reduction in revenue earnings from
their main market from 75 percent in 2002 to 59 percent in 2004. In 2005, (Table 3)
fifty six of its seventy nine ships representing 78 percent of its total carrying capacity
operated in the North American market (Mathisen, 2005, pp. 18,24 &100; Peisley,
2006, p. 34; WTO, 2003, pp. 64-76).
.
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. (RCCL) is the world’s second largest cruise company
with a total of 5 brands. It was launched in 1970 as Royal Caribbean Cruise Line
and became a publicly traded company in 1993. In 2005, the majority of this
company’s fleet was based in the Caribbean and RCCL owned three brands with 30
ships and an approximate carrying capacity of 3.1 million passengers. The unveiling
of the new brand Azamara Cruises in May 2007 signified a radical change from the
company’s single global brand strategy. RCCL, who now appears to be adopting
Carnivals’ multi-brand approach, was accredited in 2006 as having the largest cruise
vessel in the world viz. Freedom of the Seas (Mathisen, 2005, pp. 18,109; Miller,
2007a).

The Star Group consists of 3 brands, which had (in 2005) fifteen ships with a
combined carrying capacity of 1.3 million passengers. It is the third largest cruise
company in the world. Similar to Carnival and RCCL, the majority of its fleet
operates in the North American Market with 2 brands having between them 79
percent of the Group’s capacity. From its inception in 1993, Star Cruises operated
predominantly in the Asian market but in 2006 a decision was taken to operate one
vessel in the Mediterranean for the summer of that year (Mathisen, 2005, pp. 18,24
&107; Peisley, 2006; WTO, 2003).
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The key players identified above are responsible for globalizing the Caribbean
cruise experience and the subsequent revolutionization of the cruise industry. The
emergence of mega lines in the cruise industry, consolidation and high levels of
concentration, gave rise to economies of scale as well as economies of scope.
Economies of scope, according to Jones and Hill (1998), are realised when two or
more business units share resources and thus benefit by investing less in the
shared functions. Such cost savings had a downward effect on the cruise related
costs and subsequently made cruising cheaper and more affordable to a wider cross
section of the global society.
3.2

Market Share

In 2005, the three top operators as illustrated in Table 3, had a combined share of
81.4 percent of the worldwide cruise market with Carnival Corporation having 48%,
Royal Caribbean Cruises with 23.6%, and the Star Group with 9.8%. With regards
to the North American Market, which serves the Caribbean, the combined market
share was 90.1% with the following distribution: Carnival Corporation 49.9%; RCCL
30.3%; and Star Group 9.9% (Mathisen, 2005, p. 18 & 24).
Table 3: Largest cruise companies worldwide and in the North American Market-2005
Cruise Company

Ships

Capacity

Worldwide

North
America

Carnival
Corporation

79

56

6 357 438

RCC

30

28

Star Group

15

12

Market Share
Worldwide

North
America

4 971 976

48.0%

49.9%

3 127 294

3 021 550

23.6%

30.3%

1 296 800

985 200

9.8%

9.9%

81.4%

90.1%

Worldwide

North
America

Summary
124
96
10 781 532 8 978 626
Source: Compilation of various tables in Cruise Industry News 2005, p18, 24

Carnival Corporation & plc has the largest market share worldwide and in the North
American/Caribbean Market.

The company’s huge investment in marketing and

advertising has been singled out as one of the key elements for its rapid growth. In
2005, with a total of 12 brands 7 , the first and largest being its very own, 79 ships
and a world wide capacity exceeding 6.3 million, Carnival was considered the
7

Carnival Lines is the first and largest brand in the fleet.
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largest cruise company in the world. During 1989 to 1999, five brands were added to
its fleet and an additional six were obtained through the merger with P&O Princess
plc in 2003. In terms of number of ships, capacity, and market share, Carnival is
followed at a considerable distance by RCCL, which merged with Celebrity Cruises
in 1997, and the Star Group, which acquired Norwegian Cruise Line\Orient Lines in
2000. Carnival’s market leadership is well established and not even the combined
market shares of RCCL and Star Group are able to topple it from its position of
dominance (Mathisen, 2005; Peisley, 2006, p. 34; WTO, 2003).

The costs associated with tonnage acquisition, the developmental and marketing
aspects of running cruise vessel operations including fuel consumption, and home
and destination ports charges, can be quite phenomenal. This, as well as the fierce
competition which exists within the cruise industry, has prompted cruise operators to
ensure strategic initiatives are implemented for effective cost control. As a result,
the industry has become highly consolidated as is evident in Table 3 where Carnival
Corporation, RCCL and the Star Group have combined market shares exceeding
80% and 90% of the worldwide and North American markets respectively. The
extent of market concentration is easily detected in Table 3 when one realises that
the top two operators together control more than 80% of the North American Market.
The predominant method of growth within the industry has been that of mergers and
acquisitions. The most significant merger to date has been between Carnival
Corporation and P&O Princess plc, to form Carnival Corporation & plc.
3.3

Financial Performance 8

A financial analysis of a company and/or its competitors normally gives an excellent
indication of the effectiveness of a company’s strategy, the efficiency with which this
strategy is executed and suitability of its organizational structure. The 2000-2004
accounting data given for the world’s three major cruise operators (G. P. Wild
Limited, 2006, pp. 97-102) will thus be used to obtain an insight into the operations
of these three companies.

8

This section is based on an analysis of Appendix A
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3.3.1

Explanation of ratios

As illustrated in Appendix No. A, the financial ratios have already been calculated
hence, before attempting to do an analysis a brief explanation of their significance is
given below:
•

Profitability ratios: these ratios measure the long-term solvency of a
company and are good indicators of the efficiency with which a company’s
resources are used.

•

Liquidity ratios: gives an indication of how easily a company is able to pay
its current liabilities should they become due.

•

Efficiency ratios: indicate how efficiently a company utilizes its assets.

•

Financial leverage/gearing ratios: an indication of the long term solvency
of the company. The higher the gearing ratios, the more critical is the
company’s financial situation and the more vulnerable it is to bankruptcy if
sufficient profit cannot be made to cover its principal and interest obligations.

3.3.2 Carnival Corporation
In 2004, one year after its merger with P&O Princess plc where it obtained an
additional six brands to its portfolio, Carnival Corporation experienced about 123%
increase in sales over its sales figure of US$ 4.37 million for 2002.
•

All computed profitability ratios, with the exception of earnings per share,
showed a decrease from 2000 to 2003 but started increasing from 2004
onwards. Again this was a result of increased sales from the aforementioned
merger. Earnings per share, the only ratio to have steadily increased during
the review period stood at over $2 for the first time in 2004 and increased to
just under $3 in 2005.

•

Liquidity ratios steadily increased from 2000 to 2004 but declined to 2000
levels in 2004. This is because current liabilities were increasing at a faster
rate than their current assets. For example, in 2004 and 2003 current
liabilities were $5m and $3.3m and when compared to the same period
current assets stood at $1.7m and $2.1m respectfully. Prior to the merger
(2002) the company was much more liquid with current liabilities standing at
$1.6m compared with current assets of $1.1m. Current assets are therefore
insufficient to pay current liabilities should they become immediately due.
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•

Gearing ratios: These have fluctuated from 2000-2004 reaching a high of
65.2% in 2003 and a low of 45.4% in 2002. Currently, more than 50% of the
company is financed by debt. This is a significant reduction from 2003 levels
which, as previously mentioned was 65.2%.

As is evident in from 2003

onwards, over 12% of the company’s profits (EBIT) are being used to pay
interest on long-term debt.
3.3.3 Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd
Steadily increasing sales from 2000-2005 were seen by Wild (2006) as a result
of improved trading conditions arising from increased demand for cruises.
•

The computed profitability ratios have fluctuated from 2000 to 2003;
however, 2004 figures show them reaching 2000 levels. Earnings per share,
which steadily decreased from 2001, were in 2004 at 2000 levels of over $2.
Figures for 2005 showed a remarkable increase to over $3. The improved
profitability of RCCL signifies that the company became more efficient in the
allocation and distribution of its resources. This, it is assumed, is particularly
so in light of the increased dominance of Carnival Corporation & plc following
its 2003 merger with P&O Cruises plc.

•

Liquidity ratios have remained constant from 2002 at .35; however the
ratios still indicate that the company has insufficient assets to pay current
liabilities should they become due. This is readily confirmed when one
examines and realizes that from 2003 onwards current liabilities have
increased at a significantly higher rate than current assets.

•

Gearing ratios: Currently more than 100% of the company is financed by
debt as is evident from a total debt/net worth standing of over 125%. On
average, over the past 5 years (2000-2004) 41% of the company profits are
used to pay interest on long-term debt.

3.3.4 Star Cruises Group Ltd
There has been no significant increase in sales from 2002 and the company
incurred losses in every year thereafter. This dismal performance, as explained
by Wild (2006, p. 102), could have been the result of the high costs associated
with setting up NCL America and several unforeseen accidents, particularly the boiler
explosion that closed Norway’s long career and the flooding incident that delayed the
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debut of the Pride of America. Wild (2006) felt that this situation was further
compounded by SARS which had a disruptive effect on the growth of the South-East
Asian operation.
•

The computed profitability ratios have shown negative profitability in every
year except 2002. Earnings per share ratio were also negative.

•

Liquidity ratios have remained generally constant except in 2003; however,
the ratios still indicate that the company has insufficient assets to pay current
liabilities should they become due.

•

Gearing ratios: The Star Group is heavily financed by debt. In 2004 more
than 100% of the company was financed by debt and 89% of the company
profits were used to pay interest on long-term debt.

3.4

Cruise Associations

9

The two main cruise organizations that represent the interests of cruise operators in
the North American/Caribbean cruise market are the Florida Caribbean Cruise
Association (FCCA) and Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA). Collectively
they share resources to undertake marketing research, develop marketing programs,
and produce publications disseminating their findings. Additionally, they serve as a
pressure group for their members by lobbying governments and international
organizations on emerging issues, which impact upon or have the potential to
adversely affect their members. Though these associations may appear to be and
act like conferences, they, however, do not collaborate in the setting of prices nor
transportation prices (WTO, 2003, pp. 55-56).
3.4.1

Florida Caribbean Cruise Association (FCCA)

The FCCA is a not-for-profit trade organization composed of 11 cruise brands that
operate more than 100 ships in the North American/Caribbean market. Inaugurated
in 1972, its main objective is to provide a forum whereby its members can discuss
issues such as legislation, tourism development, ports, safety, and security
concerns of the cruise industry. By sharing its understanding of the cruise industry
with port authorities, governments, and private/public sector organisations in the
Caribbean, the FCCA thereby to create partnerships and cooperation with its
9

Based on WTO, 2003, p.55-56, Gibson, 2006, p.40-41, FCCA and CLIA websites
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stakeholders.

In 1992, it commissioned its first study to analyse the economic

impact of cruise tourism on destination ports with specific reference to the monetary
impact of cruise lines, their passengers and crew. Having established closer ties
with the region after 9/11 the FCCA partnered with 19 destination ports and
engaged BREA to commission a similar study in 2006 (www.f-cca.com;
http://www.cruising.org).
3.4.2

Cruise Line International Association (CLIA)

CLIA was established in 1975 and joined with the International Council of Cruise
Lines (ICCL) in 2001, to form the Cruise Line Coalition and become the information
source for the cruise industry. CLIA in 2006 eventually merged with the ICCL to
become the world’s largest cruise association with a membership, which includes 24
of the main cruise lines operating in North America. Prior to the merger CLIA was
mainly concerned with marketing and promoting the benefits of cruising on behalf of
its 24 member cruise lines and 19000 travel agencies. The member lines controlled
95.1% of the market and owned 81.2% of the ships whilst the agencies represented
66% of all agencies in the United States.

The 2006 merger between CLIA and ICCL implicitly meant that in addition to its
commitment to the promotion and growth of the cruise industry, CLIA now had to
deal with issues, such as security, vessel and passenger safety, health, insurance,
environmental degradation and conservation, consumer/passenger protection, as
well as being a lobbyist on behalf of its membership (WTO, 2003, p. 56).
3.5

Vessel Classification 10

Cruise vessels are categorised according to their size, quality of service offered,
exquisiteness of cuisine, customer to space ratio, destination focus, carrying
capacity, and the range of amenities on board. CLIA (as cited in Gibson, 2006, pp.
30-31) identified five categories, which are used for the classification of vessels:
Luxury, Premium, Resort or Contemporary, Niche or Speciality, and Value or
Traditional. These categories will be used in conjunction with Table 4, to further
10

Based on analysis of CLIA classification by Gibson 2006, p.31 and from own observations as a
pilot employed with the St. Lucia Air & Sea Ports Authority from 1989 to 2006.

24

explain the classification of vessels belonging to major cruise operators in the North
American Market.

Table 4: Defining vessel types
Definition

Description

Mega-liner
Super-liner
Midsize
Small
Boutique
Sailing Vessel
River Barge

over 2,000 passengers
between 1,000 and 2,000 passengers
between 400 and 1,000 passengers
less than 400 passengers
special purpose, usually less than 300 passengers
a ship primarily powered by wind
a ship primarily cruising on inland rivers

Source: Gibson, P. 2006, Cruise Operations Management, p.30

Luxury brands are ships that are often small in size with a few being in the midsize
category. They have the largest passenger to space ratio, and offer the ultimate in
comfort, cuisine and attentive services. On such vessels, passengers develop
intimate relationships with Captain and crew because of the vessels’ small size and
the relatively small number of passengers onboard. Crystal Cruises and Radisson
were considered market leaders in the luxury segment with shares of 38.6% and
33.4% respectively of that segment (Mathisen, 2005). Whilst Carnival Corporation
had the lowest shares (8.8%) in this market they were clearly the market leaders in
the Luxury Sailing Vessels segment with an impressive 57.4% market share.

Premium brands mainly consist of super liners with a few mega liners. Like luxury
lines, they offer excellent amenities, spacious and comfortable accommodation
areas, outside cabins with balconies as well as fine dining opportunities. The
vessels are bigger than those of the luxury brands and services are lower priced.
RCCL dominated this segment with a market share of 52.7% followed by Carnival
Corporation with 42.5% and MSC Cruises and Oceania having a combined share of
4.8% (Mathisen, 2005) .

Contemporary brands can be compared to floating resorts and mainly consist of
mega liners with a few super liners. Their vast size makes it possible for a range of
amenities to be provided and often such a brand is regarded as a destination in itself.
Gibson (2006, p.70) claims that some passengers, whilst at a destination port, prefer

25

to stay on board and enjoy the amenities rather than go on shore excursions.
Carnival Corporation is the market leader in this segment with a market share of
56.6% trailed by RCCL with 24.4% and the Star Group with 14.9% market shares
(Mathisen, 2005).

Niche brands comprise vessels ranging from midsize to mega-liners. Unlike the
other brands and in particular the contemporary brand, the niche brand focuses on
the destination using their expertise in cultural interpretation, and shore enrichment
activities to develop a unique product. This market was controlled by Carnival’s
Cunard Line with market a share of 56.1%, Delta Queen with 27.9%, and Orient
Lines with16% (Mathisen, 2005).

Lastly, the Value or Budget brand is the most economical of all brands and generally
comprise of midsize, refurbished, and older ships. Normally the customer to space
and staff to passenger ratios as well as the onboard amenities are significantly less
than those of previously mentioned brands. This market is predominantly controlled
by Imperial Majesty with a 91.3% market share (Mathisen, 2005). Other operators
include Windjammer Barefoot Cruises and Star Clippers.
3.6

Chapter Analysis

The most significant findings of this chapter are the level of market concentration,
the preferred method of growth, maintenance of brands after acquisition, and the
financial performance of cruise operators.

The high level of concentration is indicative of an industry nearing maturity.
According to Hill & Jones (1998, pp. 94-95) a mature industry is characterized by
little growth, which leads to intense rivalry for market shares and a drive to build
brand loyalty. Although this is true, caution must be exercised and due regard given
to the differences between the Caribbean and the global cruise industry. Growth in
the Caribbean for the past years has been marginal, whereas Europe and the
Mediterranean have experienced healthy growth rates. The Mediterranean (WTO,
2003) has been able to achieve fully autonomous development with minimum
reliance on the US and Canadian markets.
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Cruise operators, particularly Carnival Corporation, have displayed high levels of
managerial expertise in the growth strategy used to enter new market segments. As
previously mentioned, mergers and acquisitions have predominantly been used in
that regard and as explained by Hill & Jones (1998, pp. 326-327) the following are
the benefits to be derived:
•

Relatively short period to establish a market presence when compared to
organic growth, which generally takes a longer time;

•

Less risky because of reduced uncertainty resulting from prior knowledge
of the history, financial performance, market share and cash flows of the
target company; and

•

Less costly, especially if a company is seeking to enter a market where
existing companies have a noticeable market presence with strong brand
loyalty. A company may have such considerable brand loyalty that when
acquired, its name an ambience may not be changed (Cartwright & Baird,
1999).

In terms of financial performance, Carnival Corporation can be considered the most
efficient or stable cruise operator, when compared to RCCL and the Star Group.
The reasons are as follows: increasing profitability (sales and net profits) from year
to year; return on assets and investment ratios increased in 2004 and 2005,
returning to 2000 levels; increased capacity resulting from the merger with P&O
Princess (6 brands with a total of 36,535 lower berths were added to its own 76,789
to give a total capacity of 113,332 lower berths 11 ); highest profitability ratios; lowest
debt geared of the three-meaning that it was the least likely to go bankrupt; lowest
percentage of profits used to pay debt; and the ability to provide, on average, higher
earnings per share (EPS) than its competitors.
Mention must be made of the astounding recovery made by the Star Group when
they turned a 2003 operating loss of 20.5 million to an operating profit of 120 million
in 2004 (G. P. Wild Limited, 2006).
11

In that same year, 2003, RCCL and the Star Group had 59,678 and 24,354 lower berths respectively
(G. P. Wild Limited, 2006).
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4

4.1

Cost/Benefit Analysis

Economic Impact 12

During the cruise year 2005-2006, a total of 15.9 million passengers and crew of 6.6
million were onboard cruise vessels calling at the 19 destinations listed in Appendix
B. As indicated in Table 5, a total of 13.7 million passengers and crew of 2.6 million
went ashore in destination ports whilst the others remained onboard, either to enjoy
ship amenities or for work related purposes.
Table 5: Total Economic Impact by Segment, 2005-2006 Cruise Year
Destinations
Bahamas
Western
Caribbean
Eastern
Caribbean
Southern
Caribbean
Deep
Caribbean
Totals

Passengers
Onshore
Visits

Crew
Onshore
Visits

Total
Passengers
Expenditures

(Thousands)

(Thousands)

($US Millions)

Total Crew
Expenditures

Cruise line
Expenditures

Total
Expenditures

($US Millions)

($US Millions)

($US Millions)

1,585.5

279.8

96.0

5.6

42.8

144.4

5,454.3

985.0

442.2

47.1

97.4

586.7

4,607.6

943.6

630.9

119.9

74.9

825.7

1,018.5

213.3

86.6

11.8

11.5

109.9

1,011.0

186.9

84.6

10.1

10.3

105.0

13,676.9

2,608.6

$1,340.3

$194.5

$236.9

$1,771.7

Source: Own compilation based on information contained in
http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2006-Caribbean-Cruise-Analysis.pdf

Table 5 indicates that the 16.3 million passengers and crew who went ashore in the
Bahamas and other Caribbean locations spent an estimated US$1.5 billion on
goods and services. Cruise lines spent an additional US$237 million on port
services such as pilotage, towage, linesmen, water, environmental levies, waste
disposal and other local goods and services. In home ports and some selected

12

The majority of this section is based on an economic impact study carried out by Business Research
& Economic Advisors http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2006-Caribbean-Cruise-Analysis.pdf
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destination ports where provisioning is done, additional charges were incurred when
port operational services were used to load food, hotel supplies and other stores to
cruise vessels. The combined expenditures of passengers, crew and cruise lines
amounted to US$1.77 billion for cruise the year 2005-2006.

The Eastern Caribbean had the highest cruise tourism expenditures with a total of
US$826 million, followed by the Western Caribbean with US$587 million, the
Bahamas with US$144 million, the Southern Caribbean with US$110 million, and
the Deep Caribbean with US$105 million. The combined figure for the Eastern and
Western Caribbean represented approximately 80 percent of the total cruise tourism
expenditure 2005-2006.

Of the 13.7 million passengers who went ashore, revenues of US$1.3 billion were
generated from expenditures on shore excursions, duty free purchases of clothing
and jewellery, and handicraft and other souvenirs. Crew on passenger vessels are
generally not catered for in cruise destinations, but as indicated in Table 5, an
overall amount of US$194 million was generated by the 2.6 million crew members
who went ashore.

The Eastern Caribbean, with total crew expenditures of US$120 million represented
62 % of the total crew expenditure. A possible explanation for this high figure is the
high level of duty free shopping in St. Maarten and the US Virgin Islands.
Table 6: Direct and Indirect Economic Impacts by Segment, 2005-2006 Cruise Year
Destinations

Total
Expenditures
($US Millions)

Direct
Employment

Indirect
Employment

Direct
Employee
Wage Income

Indirect
Employee
Wage Income

($US Millions)

($US Millions)

Bahamas

144.4

2,235

1,730

34.3

26.6

Western Caribbean

586.7

8,890

5,675

100.0

73.8

Eastern Caribbean
Southern
Caribbean

825.7

9,805

7,235

172.1

130.1

109.9

1,960

1,215

16.6

10.7

Deep Caribbean

105.0

1,650

1,105

21.1

14.9

$1,771.7

24,540.0

16,960.0

$344.1

$256.1

Totals

Source: Own compilation based on information contained in
http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2006-Caribbean-Cruise-Analysis.pdf
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The US$1.77 billion in cruise tourism revenues generated in the cruise year 20052006 and shown in Table 6 resulted in direct employment for 24,540 Caribbean
nationals with businesses providing goods and services to passengers, crew and
cruise vessels. The wages earned by these employees totalled US$344 million.
Overall, when considering the total revenue of US$1.77 billion and direct
employment of 24, 540 persons, it can be reasoned that for every US$72,127 13
generated from cruise tourism, one Caribbean national was employed.

Alternatively, indirect employment of 16,960 jobs generated wages of US$256.1
million. Using the same methodology employed above, it can safely be concluded
that for every US$104,363 cruise generated revenue a positive economic impact
was produced by the resulting job that was created.
4.1.1

Direct Impact
Antigua, 720

St. Marteen, 3,210

St. Lucia, 685

Aruba, 985

US Virgin Islands,
3,525

Bahamas, 2,235

Barbados, 950
St. Kitts & Nevis, 125

Belize, 1,215
Cartagena, 95

San Juan, 2,225, 9%

Martinique, 70

Cozumel, 3,715
Key West, 755

Cayman Islands,
2,090
Costa Maya , 1,115

Dominica, 255

Curacao, 250

Grenada, 320

Figure 8: Direct Employment Impact of Cruise Tourism by Destination, 2005-2006 Cruise Year
Source: http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2006-Caribbean-Cruise-Analysis.pdf

In Table 6, the Eastern Caribbean had the highest cruise tourism expenditure with
US$826 million followed by the Western Caribbean with US$587 million. The region
with the lowest passenger expenditure was the Deep Caribbean revenues of
US$105 million and direct employment of 1650 jobs.
An examination of Figure 8 shows that San Juan (9.6%), St. Maarten (13%), and the
US Virgin Islands (14%) made up 36% of the total direct employment created from
13

US$1.77 billion /24,540 jobs = US$72,127.
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the US$1.77 billion cruise tourism expenditure. In the Eastern Caribbean segment,
the three destinations represented 91% of total employment figure of 9805 jobs for
that segment. The other two destinations represented in the Eastern Caribbean
segment are Antigua, and St. Kitts & Nevis with job creation levels of 3% and 1%
respectively. The great disparity within that segment can probably be explained by
the dual status of San Juan as a home and destination port, the orientation of St.
Maarten and the US Virgin Islands towards duty free shopping. ECLAC (2005)
implicitly states that the US Virgin Islands will enjoy the highest cruise tourism
expenditures because their duty free exemptions are higher than that of other
Caribbean islands.

Cozumel has a very impressive direct employment figure of 3,715 which is 2.9%
greater than the combined number of jobs in the Southern Caribbean and Deep
Caribbean. Destinations in the Southern Caribbean include Barbados with 950 jobs,
Dominica with 255, Martinique with 70 and St. Lucia with an overall number of 685
created jobs. Likewise, a breakdown of the Deep Caribbean includes Aruba with 985,
Cartagena 14 with 95, Curacao with 250, and Grenada with a total of 320 jobs arising
from cruise tourism expenditure of US$16.3 million.
The Bahamas, with its cruise ports of Nassau and Freeport ranks 6th with cruise
revenues of US$144.4 million but 4th in terms of direct employment creation. The
dominant position enjoyed by the Eastern and Western Caribbean segments, and
Bahamas should be expected since in Figure 5, they had relatively high market
shares of 36%, 30% and 18% respectively.
4.1.2

Indirect Impact

Figure 9, which show the indirect impact of cruise tourism by destination mirrors
Figure 8 in many respects. Destinations such as US Virgin Islands, St. Maarten and
Puerto Rico in the Eastern Caribbean, the Bahamas, and Cozumel and Cayman
Islands in the Western Caribbean segments fared much better than their counterparts in the Southern and Deep Caribbean. 42% of the destinations in Figure 9

14

Cartagena is really in South America but for this exercise is treated as part of the Deep Caribbean.
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experienced low indirect impacts and had less than 500 jobs created whilst 15.7%
had above 2000 jobs generated indirectly by cruise tourism. The destinations, in
order of rank, with the highest number of indirect jobs in Figure 8 are Cozumel, US
Virgin Islands, and St. Maarten. In Figure 9, though they still share the top three
spots the ranking this time has changed with US Virgin Islands attaining the highest
rank followed by St. Maarten and then Cozumel.
US Virgin Islands,
2,640
St. Marteen, 2,380

Antigua, 495

Bahamas, 1,730
Barbados, 685

Aruba, 725
Belize, 670

St. Lucia, 350

Cartagena, 45
St. Kitts & Nevis,
80

Cayman Islands,
1,615

Puerto Rico, 1,640
Costa Maya , 655
Martinique, 45
Key West, 505

Curacao, 170
Grenada, 165

Cozumel, 2,230

Dominica, 135

Figure 9: Indirect Impact of Cruise Tourism by Destination, 2005-2006 Cruise year
Source: http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2006-Caribbean-Cruise-Analysis.pdf

4.2

Environmental Impact

The environmental impact of cruise tourism on destination ports, adverse or
otherwise, is caused by complex relationships among the various stakeholders.
Such stakeholders include but are not limited to Cruise Operators, Flag States, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), and Destination Ports. The latter includes
governments, port authorities, tour operators, attraction administrators, agents and,
to a lesser extent, the inhabitants themselves.

Cruise vessels are central to any analysis on environmental impact studies related
to cruise tourism. These vessels, in addition to being the link between Home and
Destination Ports, are designed, built, and marketed as floating hotels. The many
amenities onboard these vessels which assist in achieving this strategy generate
waste, which, in some instances, has been indiscriminately dumped along the sea
routes plied by these vessels (OCEANA, "n.d.").
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Johnson (2002, p. 263) uses the life-cycle analysis (LCA) 15 to categorise the impact
cruise tourism has on the environment. The five categories used in the LCA
methodology are infrastructural, operational, distribution, use, and waste impacts.
They are analysed as follows:
•

Infrastructural impacts begin with the construction of the vessel and
continue with the modifications to the natural habitats to build berths and
cruise terminals.

•

Operational impacts pertain to the vessel and the effect it has on the
ocean and air quality. Such impacts are caused by antifouling paints,
damage caused to coral reefs by anchoring operations and the emission of
exhausts and ozone depleting substances by ship engines.

•

Distribution impacts are those associated with tourist travel and the
logistics of provisioning a cruise liner. It also involves going over the
carrying capacity of destinations and any congestion or pollution caused by
landside transport links.

•

Use impacts are those related to social, cultural, health, and economic
activities as well as the impacts of recreational activities on wild life.

•

Waste impacts refer to ship generated wastes such as oils, garbage,
sewage, plastics and other hazardous substances which require port
reception facilities for ship to shore disposal. Gray water (waste water)
from sinks, showers, galleys and laundry contains significant contaminants
and should also be included in this section.

4.2.1

Air pollution

Cruise vessels use fuel not only to power their engines but also to maintain the
integrated

electrical

systems

used

to

create

that

“wow”

effect

onboard

(www.oceana.org). That very fuel however, when emitted as exhaust into the
atmosphere can and does impact negatively on human beings as well as the
stratosphere.

15

LCA was developed by British Airways to categorise the impact of tourism on the Seychelles.
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The exhausts from diesel engines comprise many gases, the most significant of
which are nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulphur oxides (SOx), and carbon dioxide (CO2).
NOx and SOx emissions have high environmental impacts and are known for causing
acid rain, over-fertilization of lakes and soil, and potential damage to vegetation and
human health. SOx emissions are negligible at sea but more pronounced near
coastlines and especially in cruise ports, which are normally located near major
residential areas. Lastly, CO2, which is a natural constituent of the air, is considered
a major greenhouse gas, which contributes to global warming (Hellén, 2003).

Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78, effectively sets limits on sulphur oxide and nitrogen
oxide emissions from ship exhausts and prohibits deliberate emissions of ozone
depleting substances. It must be noted that irrespective of this, the Caribbean has
not been designated as a SOx Emission Control Area (SECA) and does not have the
capacity to monitor nor determine, the extent of environmental damage caused by
cruise vessels (International Maritime Organization, 1997) .

It is very difficult, therefore, to allocate any monetary costs to the toxic emissions
from cruise ships. However, according to the Bluewater Network (2006), shipping
emissions contribute to substantial human health and environmental problems.
People living near ports experience higher levels of cancer, heart attacks, asthma,
respiratory illness and other cardiopulmonary problems as well as premature death.

This type of pollution, considered an operational impact, has not gone unnoticed.
Research is currently being done to determine the most cost-effective option aimed
at reducing the level of harmful emissions from ship engines. The International
Maritime Organization along with other stakeholders such as International
Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), and the International
Bunker Industry Association (IBIA) are in the forefront of this research. Available
options include the burning of distillate fuel, installation of scrubbers, and using low
sulphur heavy fuels (Cruise Industry News, 2007).

In the interim, the Caribbean should be hoping that the intensive lobbying efforts by
environmental groups allied with Friends of the Earth International (Bluewater
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Network, 2006) will succeed in getting the IMO to introduce air pollution controls on
both new and existing engines to assist in drastically reducing air pollution from
diesel ship engines.
4.2.2

Ship generated wastes

Ship generated wastes, especially the magnitude generated by cruise vessels, have
led the IMO to designate the Wider Caribbean as a “special area” under Annex V:
Garbage of MARPOL 73/78. The Caribbean is thus afforded higher levels of
protection than other areas of the sea due to technical reasons relating to its
oceanographic and ecological conditions as well as its heavy reliance on cruise
tourism. Annex V goes further to put the obligation on governments who have
ratified this regulation, to ensure that adequate port reception facilities 16 are
available for garbage reception (International Maritime Organization, 1991).

The Caribbean is the world’s top cruise destination and one where the majority of
very large cruise vessels (VLCVs) have been deployed. This should be a cause of
environmental concern when considering the waste generation capacity of such
vessels, the tarnished history of cruise lines for deliberately polluting, and the lack of
adequate port reception facilities in destination ports. A cruise ship with a carrying
capacity of 2,000-3,000 passengers (OCEANA, "n.d.") can potentially generate
waste per passenger per day of approximately 300 litres of greywater, 40 litres of
blackwater, 10 litres of bilge water, 3.5 kilos of garbage and 30 grams of toxic waste.
Table 7: Amount of waste generated in the Bahamas and Caribbean for the year 2004
(000’s)

Grey
water

Black
water

Bilge
water

(litres)

(litres)

(litres)

Bahamas
Western
Caribbean
Eastern
Caribbean
Southern
Caribbean
Deep Caribbean

2767

830100

110680

6323

1896900

6826

Total

Segments

(kilos)

Toxic
Residue

27670

9685

83010

252920

63230

22131

189690

2047800

273040

68260

23891

204780

5131

1539300

205240

51310

17959

153930

1751

525300

70040

17510

6129

52530

22798

6839400

911920

227980

79793

683940

Passengers

Garbage

(grams)

Source: Own compilation of data, selection of base year and segments based on concept depicted in
http://www.oceana.org/fileadmin/oceana/uploads/europe/reports/cruise_ships_eng.pdf p.1
16

Port reception facilities will be discussed thoroughly in Section 4.2.3

35

Taking the calculated waste per passenger per day, Table 7 shows the amount of
waste that was generated in 2004 in the combined geographic segments of the
Bahamas and the Caribbean. The scope of this dissertation does not allow for a
thorough analysis of methods used by cruise vessels, to dispose of waste that is not
incinerated or treated onboard as well as waste which cannot be disposed of in
Caribbean ports.

Surely, if wastes are dumped at sea then the magnitude of

externalities arising from this environmental degradation would far outweigh any
benefits derived.

In the past, especially in the United States, cruise lines have been prosecuted and
heavily fined for their deliberate circumvention of MARPOL 73/78. For example, 87
confirmed cases were prosecuted in the United States and fines in excess of $US
30 million were levied against cruise lines during 1993 to 1998. As recently as 2002,
fines of $US18 million and US$1.5 million were levied at Carnival Corporation and
Norwegian Cruise Line respectively for illegally dumping wastes in US waters
( ECLAC, 2005; Schmidt, 2000).

Today, unlike in the past, the major cruise operators have demonstrated more
cognizance of the potential impact the industry has on the environment. The turn
around began in 2003 when RCCL, the very first in the industry, attained the
internationally accredited environmental management certificate of ISO 14001.
Having substantially invested in its own fleet, market leader Carnival Corporation &
plc followed suit and attained ISO 14001 certification on September 12, 2006.
According to its chairman and CEO Micky Arison, “Carnival Corporation & plc will
continue to undertake wide ranging environmental initiatives in an effort to reduce its
environmental footprint” (Cruise Industry News, 2006; Peisley, 2006).

This view is echoed by Gibson (2006) who seems to suggest, that cruise ships now
treat ship generated wastes in accordance to industry regulatory requirements which
are often more stringent and demanding than government regulations.
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4.2.3

Port reception facilities

As per Regulation 12 (1) of Annex I: Oil, Regulation 10 (1) of Annex IV: Sewage and
Regulation 7 (1) of Annex V: Garbage of MARPOL 73/78, parties to the Convention
should ensure that reception facilities are available at their ports and terminals for
ship generated wastes. The operation of such facilities should not cause undue
delays to ships and should have the capacity to meet the requirements of the ships
using them (IMO, 2002). The Convention designating the Wider Caribbean region as
a Special Area, was adopted on 4 July 1991, came into force on 4 April 1993, but to
date has not taken effect. According to Francesco J.L Inglés 17 , the Convention only
takes effect when Caribbean nations indicate to the IMO that they are equipped with
reception facilities as per the above cited regulations (F.J.L. Ingles, personal
communication, August 3, 2007;International Maritime Organization, 1991).
The Saint Lucia Solid Waste Management Authority (SLSWMA) agrees that many
regional states do not have IMO approved “reception facilities” and alluded to the
cost factor as a possible reason for their unavailability.

SLSWMA, however,

explained that many CARICOM states work closely with cruise lines to facilitate the
reception and disposal of certain categories of ship generated wastes. Saint Lucia
for example, through the collaborative efforts of the Saint Lucia Solid Waste
Management Authority and local businesses, is able to receive and dispose of
plastics, solid wastes, biomedical wastes and oil/oily wastes. Cruise lines, through
their agents, are required to give 48 hours prior notice of their intentions to dispose
of such waste (SLSWMA, Personal communication, July 03, 2007).
4.3

Social Impact

Socially, cruise tourism has had both positive and negative influences on the
Caribbean. Proponents of its positive impact see cruise tourism as an engine which
generates renewed awareness and celebration of indigenous Caribbean cultures
and historic sites. This is of particular importance to the region, especially since with
the passage of time, cultural values and the historical significance of various sites

17

Francesco J.L Inglés is the Head of the Oil Pollution Prevention & Implementation Section of IMO
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and monuments are not readily transmitted from one generation to the next (King,
LeBlanc, & Lowe, 2000).

Alternatively, critics view cruise tourism as being responsible for rekindling
memories of the slave/master relationship and thus leading to the relegation of black
people. They also argue that treating the region’s culture, land and people as a
commodity to foreigners must definitely have a strong impact on the way that
nationals view themselves and their culture (King, LeBlanc, & Lowe, 2000).
Nurez, (as cited in Cartwright & Baird, 1999), defines acculturation as a process
whereby groups borrow aspects of culture from each other. He sees it as a very
one-sided process because of the short time cruise vessels spend in destination
ports. As a result, it may be difficult for an individual American or British passenger
to internalise the culture of a destination, but relatively easy for its inhabitants to
acquire aspects of their social and cultural attributes.

This, Nurez argues, was

possible because inhabitants of destination ports would be exposed to thousands of
American and British nationals during the cruise season. He identified linguistic
aspects as being the easiest to adopt and incorporate into the day-to-day lives of the
Caribbean inhabitants.

Dermot Saltibus, Ex-Director of Maritime Affairs of the Saint Lucia Air & Sea Ports
Authority, sees the social problem of drug smuggling as being a potential risk
associated with cruise tourism. In most instances, passengers leave the vessel and
proceed directly to excursion buses, dive boats, catamarans and other pleasure
craft without having to go through customs and security checks. On cruise vessels,
security checks are executed when passengers or shore personnel are embarking
and not during disembarkation (D. Saltibus, personal communication, July 15, 2007).
4.4

Security Issues 18

The Caribbean, the world’s number one cruise destination, is literally located in the
“back yard” of the United States and often referred to as its “third border”. The
region is heavily dependent on cruise tourism and in accordance with the US
18

Based on findings of United States Government Accountability Office and IMO website
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Government Accountability Office (2007), an estimated 68 percent of cruise
passengers in the Caribbean in 2006 were from North America. The North American
source market can thus be regarded as the backbone of the Caribbean’s cruise
industry.

The most significant security initiative to ever emerge in the region and which has
had lasting impacts on all ports is the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code (ISPS). It was developed by the IMO in response to perceived threats to ships
and port facilities following the terror attacks on the United States on September 11,
2001. The Code’s approach of ensuring the security of ships and port facilities was
practically one of risk assessment and management. The most effective method
recommended to assess risk was to treat each perceived threat on the basis of its
own merit and then determine the most appropriate security measures to employ
http://www.imo.org.

The ISPS Code, therefore, called on Contracting Governments to make every effort
to enhance the level of security at their port facilities, especially since the events of
9/11 implicitly signified that acts of terrorism were real and not imaginary. Port
facilities were thus required to develop security plans, increase the complement of
security officers, and more extensive use of security equipment. This would allow
port facilities to have better control over port access and improved monitoring of the
activities of people, cargo, and the movement of marine craft (Moth, 2003).

The costs incurred by regional states to be ISPS compliant were considerable taking
into account the tranquil environment and generally lax security at most ports. A
considerable amount of borrowing had to be undertaken by regional states to
upgrade their security levels and be cleared for compliance by the stipulated date of
July 1, 2004. According to port officials at the Barbados Port Incorporation, the
introduction of new security measures entailed spending vast sums of money. They,
however, saw the high compliance costs as being necessary to maintain the
region’s accolade of being one of the safest destinations worldwide (Faria, 2005).
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This view of the Caribbean being a “safe zone” is substantiated in a recent report
released by the US Government Accountability Office (2007) on Port Security in the
Caribbean. The Agency stated that US intelligence sources found no specific,
credible terrorist threats to maritime security in the Caribbean Basin.
4.5

Liner Shipping Impact

Cruise tourism in the Caribbean, as has been repeatedly said, is a huge business.
All destination ports, particularly those which rely heavily on this industry, give
priority berthing to cruise vessels. In small ports with a combination of dedicated
cruise terminals 19 and multi-user berths, this practice is more pronounced. On a
typical day during the cruise season, where all berths have been assigned to cruise
vessels, it is customary for container vessels to spend as much as thirteen hours at
the anchorage. The monetary costs, associated with such lengthy delays to liner
shipping companies, shippers and their customers, are hardly ever considered by
port authorities.

Saltibus believes that port operators should examine the impact of their berthing
policies on the general economy. In instances where berthing conflicts exist, then
ports should seek alternative means of accommodation and use anchorages rather
than compromise the movement of general cargoes. Saltibus, fervently argued, that
the some port operators were insensitive to the added cost incurred by shipping
companies arising from the berthing priority given to cruise vessels (D. Saltibus,
personal communication, July 15, 2007).

Fritz Pinnock, Executive Director of the Jamaica Maritime Institute, and Pilots
Lazarus Joseph and Gary Benjamin from the Grenada and Dominica Port
Authorities, all agree that priority berthing given to cruise vessels can adversely
impact on the operations of container vessels. However, Pinnock, Joseph and
Benjamin all shared the view that since ports operated on a 24-hour basis, container
vessels had the opportunity to work at nights and lessen the impacts related to
waiting time. Additionally, Pilot Joseph indicated that notwithstanding this adversity,

19

This refers to berths dedicated for cruise vessels in general and not for any particular cruise line.
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with adequate communication between the port and shipping agents, container
vessels could always adjust their arrival times to arrive “just in time” and thus avoid
undue delays and costs (F. Pinnock, personal communications, July 12-18, 2007).

Wood (as cited in Seidl, Guiliano, & Pratt, 2006) held the view, that it was almost a
universal practice to give berthing priority to cruise vessels. He implied that cruise
vessels had a domineering attitude, hated to wait in line, and at the slightest sign of
delay, would threaten to cancel the call. Woods felt that this practice was detrimental
to cargo vessels and generally, unjustified economically.
4.6

Chapter Analysis

The cruise industry appears to be contributing quite significantly to destination ports
as was depicted in Tables 5 & 6, and in Figures 8 & 9. Revenues generated from
the cruise industry were obtained not only from cruise passengers but also from
various vessels and members of the crew. However, taking into account the
changing demography of cruisers, the lower costs of cruising brought about by
economies of scale, and the tendency to market the vessel as the prime destination,
one wonders just how significant are the much proclaimed benefits.

Table 8: Comparison of economic benefits of selected destinations for cruise year 2005-2006
Destinations

Total
Expenditures
($US Millions)

Bahamas
Belize
Cayman Is.

Direct
Employment

% of
Population

Total
Employment

% of
Population

Population

144.4

2,235

0.7%

3,965

1.3%

303,770

64.2

1,215

0.4%

1,885

0.6%

300,000

179.7

2,090

8.8%

3,705

15.6%

23,800

St. Maarten

246.4

3,210

5.2%

5,590

9.0%

61,967

US Virgin Is.

361.6

3,525

3.5%

6,165

6.1%

101,809

Barbados

57.3

950

0.4%

1,635

0.6%

257,083

St. Lucia

34.8

685

0.4%

1,035

0.7%

152,335

Aruba

66.2

985

1.5%

1,710

2.6%

65,100

Curacao

18.0

250

0.2%

420

0.3%

143,816

Source: Own compilation based on data found in www.ipoaa.com/caribbean_population.htm &
http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2006-Caribbean-Cruise-Analysis.pdf

Table 8, which compares cruise tourism expenditures for selected destinations to
the jobs created as a percentage of the population, clearly shows that directly or
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otherwise, the benefits were marginal. The only destinations in Table 8, benefiting
slightly better than others, but marginal nevertheless, are the Cayman Islands, Sint
Maarten, and the US Virgin Islands. Coincidentally, these destinations all have
overseas territory status and belong to Britain, Holland and the United States
respectively. Further research may be needed to determine if any correlation exists
when the status of a destination is compared to its cruise tourism revenues, level of
jobs created and island-related attributes, especially those attributes which serve as
a stimulant for investment.

Any business venture related to the cruise tourism industry will more than likely have
environmental impacts as described in the life cycle analysis previously discussed in
Section 4.2-Environmental Impact. The magnitude of impacts can, however, be
lessened if proactive action is taken by all stakeholders and if operations are
consistently monitored. For example, the Port of Le Havre, during the construction
phase of its Project 2000, spent a substantial amount to restore mud flats, build a
sanctuary for birds, and create an ecological beach. Arrangements were also made
to undertake scientific follow up studies for about 10 years after the construction of
Port 2000 (Port of Le Havre Authority, 2007).

The Caribbean, in comparison, hardly undertakes any environmental impact studies
for port infrastructural development or for the creation of tourist attractions. Fritz
Pinnock and Dermot Saltibus agree, that the high cost of cruise ship environmental
impact studies is one reason why few regional states monitor the impact of cruise
tourism on regional states. They also generally agreed that the environmental levy
was not always used for environmental purposes and in most instances was placed
in governments’ consolidated fund (F. Pinnock; D. Saltibus, personal communication,
July 14-15, 2007).

Knowing this, as well as the historical evidence of cruise vessels at times
intentionally circumventing MARPOL 73/78, one can only wonder on the extent of
dumping which has been done in the Caribbean. This is particularly frightening,
given the scale of wastes generated by vessels operating in the region during 2004
(see Table 7) and the many health problems, even deaths that may have occurred.
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Both Pinnock and Saltibus, expressed the view, that the absence of a regional policy
to govern the collection, transportation and disposal of ship-generated wastes may
lead to a situation where the costs of cruise tourism far exceed its benefits.

As an agent of cultural and social change, cruise tourism is extremely influential.
The Caribbean is known for having a homophobic culture which, strangely enough,
is more receptive to lesbians than gays. Undertaking detailed research to confirm
this is not necessary; a simple Google search on “gay bashing in the Caribbean”
will generate tons of information. For better or for worse, it will never be known, the
cruise industry has managed by virtue of its economic power, to get some regional
states to allow vessels with gay cruisers into their ports. The very first time a vessel
with gay cruisers called at Port Castries in St. Lucia, many taxi drivers withheld their
services that day as a sign of protest against gays.

The situation on a subsequent visit of that vessel came as a shock. The same
drivers who vehemently protested months before were now in the forefront of drivers
who wanted to offer their services. The reason for this apparently sudden change
was the high economic value attached to gay cruisers by drivers who had no
reservations in offering their services to that category of cruiser 20 .

Though this

may appear minor but for this to happen in a region where it is illegal to marry
someone of the same sex, it is significant.

This last point brings an end to this chapter because it shows the importance of the
revenues generated by cruise tourism to people directly involved in the industry.
Though the number of jobs created may be low, when consideration is given to the
multiplier effect of every dollar, a greater number of persons gain from the industry
than what research would otherwise indicate.

20

Apparently, the cruisers had given very attractive tips to their taxi drivers.

43

5

5.1

Critical Issues Facing Destination Ports

Increasing Vessel Size

Table 9 shows the changing size, carrying capacity and cost of selected cruise
vessels plying the Caribbean during 1987 to 2006. It also reveals the gross tonnage
of new projects being undertaken by Carnival Cruise Lines and Royal Caribbean
International. In 1987, the Royal Viking Sun, to some ports, would have been
considered to be a mega vessel and those ports at that time had facilities to
adequately accommodate her. The emergence of increasingly larger vessels meant
that only the smaller vessels could be berthed alongside whilst the new comers
found accommodation at the anchorage. A system of “tendering” was thus
introduced whereby small boats and in some cases the cruise vessels’ life boats
would be used to shuttle passengers from ship to shore and vice versa.
Table 9: Changing size, carrying capacity and cost of selected cruise vessels, 1987-2009
Year

Name of Vessel

Line

Passenger
Capacity

Length

37,845

672

NF

(in feet)

($US
Millions)

Royal Viking Sun

Cunard

1993

Sensation

Carnival

2,056

920

70,367

855

300.0

1998

Grand Princess
Marnier of the
21
Seas

Princess

2,600

1,100

109,000

951

400.0

RCI

3,114

1,181

142,000

1,020

Queen Mary-2*
Freedom of the
Seas

Cunard

2,640

1,253

150,000

1,132

550.0
NF

RCI

1,385
NF

1,112

Carnival

3,634
NF

158,000

Pinnacle Project

720.0
NF

Project Genesis

RCI

5,400.0

NF

220,000

1,180

NF

2003
2006
2009
2009

384

Cost

Gross
Tonnage

1987

2003

740

Crew

200,000

NF-No Found; * Queen Mary 2 visits the Caribbean twice a year on her transatlantic crossing

Source: Mathisen, O., 2005, p.79-100; http://shipstips.com

Eventually, upon realising that the big ship trend was continuing, destination ports
took the plunge and obtained finance through loans and grants to upgrade their
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All references made to Voyager of the Seas would have the same specifications as this vessel
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facilities. Harbours were dredged, berths constructed, passenger terminals built,
shore attractions enhanced, and most importantly, human resources were trained to
provide support services. This era also saw the modification of the tour concept
whereby it was no longer sufficient to simply “drive around” with tourists and stop at
prearranged locations for meals; a tour was redefined to incorporate a host of
activities, some cultural in nature when such stops were made.

Not long after regional states had undergone extensive and expensive upgrades,
and before they could have even repaid a significant loan amount, the size of cruise
vessels again was on the increase. An example is given of the Saint Lucia Air & Sea
Ports Authority investing EC$14.4 22 million to upgrade the two cruise-only finger
piers to continuous berths in March 2000.

By July 2002, an additional EC$3.9

million was spent to modify one of the recently constructed berths. This was
“supposedly” necessary to facilitate the berthing of Adventure of the Seas in August
2002.

Throughout the Caribbean, other islands also invested in their berthing and terminal
facilities so as to be in a state of readiness for mega cruise vessels, if and when
they do call. Examples are St. Maarten, St. Kitts, Dominica, Jamaica, Grenada, and
Antigua (Peisley, 2006).

5.1.1 Capacity to accommodate mega cruise vessels
Further research to ascertain whether destination ports in the region had the
capacity to accommodate mega cruise lines revealed the following:
Bahamas
A tourism official at the Freeport Harbour Company Limited confirmed that both
Freeport Harbour and Nassau had eight cruise ship berths. At Freeport the berths
had a continuous length of 4, 500 feet and Nassau, a total of 4,904 feet. The
maximum draft was 32 feet. The largest class of vessel, which could be
accommodated at either of the ports, was that of the Voyager Class with an overall
length of 1020 feet. According to the unnamed official, there were no immediate
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US$1.00 is equivalent to EC$2.67
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plans to upgrade any of the berths (Freeport Harbour Company Limited, personal
communication, July 24, 2007).

Western Caribbean
Belize: Anthony Mahler of the Belize Tourist Board admitted that there were no
berths to accommodate cruise vessels in Belize. As a result, all vessels anchored
approximately five miles off the coast and tenders were used to shuttle passengers
ashore. He indicated that there were ongoing discussions between Royal Caribbean
International (RCI) and a Belizean who owned an island to construct two mega
cruise vessel berths on his premises. RCI is the co-owner of the Belize Tourism
Village with global jewellery retailer, Diamonds International. Mahler also alluded to
a US$50-60 million deal between Carnival Lines and the local owner of a cargo port
in Belize to construct a cruise port for mega vessels. Apparently, there was a break
down in talks between the two parties and the local entrepreneur is now seeking
other partners to pursue the venture (A. Mahler, personal communication, July 23,
2007).

Cayman Islands: Joseph Wood of the Port Authority of the Cayman Islands
acknowledged that all cruise vessels were accommodated at the anchorage since
no physical berths existed. He, however, hinted that talks were in progress to
construct a facility to simultaneously berth four mega cruise vessels. As implied by
Peisley (2006), the Cayman Islands had a very high intrinsic value since it
consistently was in the top three or four Caribbean cruise destinations, despite there
being no physical berths. Efforts to obtain an estimated project cost from Wood
were futile (J. Wood, personal communication, July 23, 2007).

Jamaica: Captain Mendes of the Port Authority of Jamaica gave some insightful
information about the capacity of Jamaica to berth not only the largest vessel afloat
today, but also of their preparations to provide a berth alongside for the Genesis in
2009 (Table 9). Freedom of the Seas, currently the worlds’ largest cruise vessel,
can be safely berthed at Ocho Rios and Montego Bay. At present, studies are
underway to assess the feasibility of converting the vacant port of San Falmouth into
a cruise terminal. Captain Mendes explained that the nature of the cruise industry
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was such that, within a few years of undertaking berth upgrades, new and bigger
vessels were being built. A port, desirous of maintaining its competitiveness, would
also have to adapt its development to coincide with that of new vessel releases
(Mendes, personal communication, July 23, 2007).

Eastern Caribbean
Antigua: Chief Pilot Michael Emmanuel indicated that Heritage Quay could
accommodate four Voyager Class vessels and the Deep water Harbour two (Table
9). In accordance with Emmanuel, Heritage Quay had four cruise-only berths and
Deep Water Harbour had two commercial berths which were also used for cruise
vessels. The Chief Pilot further revealed that the port, in keeping with the
requirements of RCCL, was planning to increase the diameter of the turning basin
by 50 meters to facilitate the safe manoeuvring of the Freedom of the Seas when
she makes her inaugural call. He was, however, quick to point out that the port was
nearing its limit with regards to the size of vessel that can be berthed (M. Emmanuel,
personal communication, July 23, 2007).

St. Maarten: An island known for its attractive duty free shopping facilities can berth
three Voyager Class vessels alongside and two small vessels (Table 4-defining
vessel types). Romain Laville, of the St. Maarten Port Authority, explained that
during the peak of the cruise season, the island would sometimes have visitors from
6-9 cruise vessels per day. Vessels unable to get a berth would normally anchor a
few cables off the capital Philipsburg and use tenders to get passengers ashore. In
that regard, a jetty to berth 12 tenders has recently been constructed. Freedom of
the Seas according to Romaine, has docked alongside the Dr. A.C. Wathey cruise
facility and preparations were already being made to berth the Genesis in 2009
(Romain Laville, personal communication, July 23, 2007).

Southern Caribbean
Barbados: In the past Barbados, in keeping with the views expressed by Pilot
James Padmore could easily berth 6-7 cruise vessels, but now, with the increasing
size of vessels, the port’s capacity had reduced to three Voyager Class vessels.
Padmore was confident that his port could accommodate the Freedom Class
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vessels having berthed the Queen Mary 2 alongside in recent times (J. Padmore,
personal communication, July 23, 2007).

Dominica: Pilot Garry Benjamin expressed concern with the ever increasing size of
cruise vessels, since it meant costly upgrades to existing facilities and perhaps even
the construction of new ones. The largest vessel to berth at the Cabrits Cruise Ship
Berth was of the Grand Princess Class in Table 9. Pilot Benjamin was positive that
larger vessels could be berthed so long as their draft did not exceed 10 meters.
Dominica has three cruise ship berths with one of the three having cruise-only status
(G. Benjamin, personal communication, July 12, 2007).

St. Lucia: Port Castries can accommodate two Voyager Class, one Sensation Class,
and two Royal Viking Class vessels simultaneously (see Table 9). The port has two
cruise-only berths, owns a duty-free shopping complex and has plans on
constructing a crew entertainment facility to tap into crew expenditure as a source of
cruise related revenue. Port Castries, according to Chief Pilot O. Cadet, has a
turning basin of 1400 feet and thus sufficient space to manoeuvre and berth
Freedom Class vessels. He further explained that Berths 3 & 4 were upgraded in
2006 and high wind bollards were installed to facilitate the safe mooring of that class
of vessel. He did indicate that dredging had to be done and talks had been held
with Captain Neilsen of Royal Caribbean International pertaining to the Freedom of
the Seas (O. Cadet, personal communication, July 25, 2007).

Deep Caribbean
Grenada: In the past, all vessels of the Sensation Class (Table 9) and above
anchored off Capital city St. Georges and shuttled passengers ashore. However,
the new EC$33 million Melville Street berthing facility allows vessels of Grand
Princess Class to berth on either side of the facility. Pilot Lazarus Joseph, Grenada
Ports Authority, indicated that smaller vessels can be accommodated at the
commercial port of St. Georges. Joseph, however, had reservations about the
adequacy of the new facility to facilitate the berthing of increasingly larger vessels
and the congestion that may result at heritage sites ashore. Queen Mary 2 visited
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Grenada and berthing space was provided at the anchorage (L. Joseph, personal
communication, July 18, 2007).

Aruba: Richard Lecla, Aruba Ports Authority, Inc. indicated that the island’s main
harbour had three cruise ship berths and one multi-user berth. The largest vessel
the port could accommodate belonged to the Grand Princess Class listed in Table 9.
Lecla, however, revealed that plans were currently underway to upgrade the port’s
berthing facility in 2008 to berth Voyager Class vessels (R. Lecla, personal
communication, July 23, 2007).
5.2

Balance of Power between Cruise Operators and Regional Ports

The term balance of power in the context of this dissertation refers to the ability of
one entity to exert control over the actions of another by using its own strategic
advantages or by exploiting inherent weaknesses of the other entity. It implicitly
means that the party asked to perform a task will comply irrespective of not being in
agreement or being placed in a disadvantageous position as a result.

Cruise

operators in the Caribbean are perceived to have the balance of power in their
favour and on several occasions have been accused of using that power against
destination ports.

In assessing the validity of this allegation the following issues will be discussed;
level of concentration among cruise operators, substitutability of destinations,
market representation, cooperation among destination ports, and dependence of
destination ports on cruise tourism.
5.2.1

Level of concentration

As previously discussed in Chapter 3, cruise operators Carnival Corporation, RCCL
and the Star Group, have among them shares representing as much as, 90% of the
North American Market. The largest cruise operators possess among them
considerable power, which is often used during negotiations with suppliers,
destination ports and other key industry players. Gibson (2006) asserts that cruise
operators aim to reduce costs as much as possible without negatively affecting
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quality. Gibson further explained that negotiation is done to achieve the best ratio of
price to quality and to benefit from economies of scale and negotiating power.

On several occasions cruise operators have flexed their powerful muscles in the
region to send a strong message to destination ports and thus keep them in line. In
1993 the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community met in Nassau and
agreed to the concept of a minimum head tax to be levied on cruise passengers.
Subsequently a figure of US$15 per passenger was agreed upon, but the cruise
lines through the FCCA voiced their displeasure and threatened to remove the 13
Caribbean Islands from their itineraries if the tax was imposed. This show of power
had the desired effect and within a week, the islands broke ranks and never
implemented the tax (http://www.history.pdx.edu/hdwp/economy/grenada_ec.html).
Another glaring example of power play between cruise operators and destination
ports occurred in 1999 when Carnival Cruise Lines gave notice of its immediate
removal of Grenada from its itineraries. The cruise line cited the reason for this
action as being its objection to a 1996 Environmental Levy 23 of US$1.50 per
passenger that was imposed by islands of the Eastern Caribbean. At the time of its
withdrawal, Carnival was responsible for 50% of cruisers who visited Grenada
(http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres115_99.htm).
5.2.2

Substitutability of destinations

The proximity of Caribbean islands to each other is one of the strategic advantages
the region has over its competitors. However, the general movement of cruise traffic
towards the Western Caribbean has resulted in the loss of market share and the
creation of excess capacity in other regional segments. The proximity of islands and
the existence of excess capacity have weakened the negotiating power of
destination ports and made it relatively easy to switch from one destination port to
another.
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This levy was to help meet the cost of solid waste reception and disposal arising from the operations
of cruise vessels in the region.
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The situation is worsened by the intensifying of competition between destination
ports and according to Gibson (2006) this leads to a situation where port fees for
many Caribbean islands are relatively inexpensive, ranging from US$4 to US$6 per
customer. This point is supported by Wilmsmeier (2006) who states that individual
ports have a weak negotiating position against the demands and threats of the
cruise industry. Wilmsmeier further explained that terminals are often put in a
position of having to make concessions to either keep ships coming back or to
entice ships to come.

The negotiating power of destination ports is further marginalized when cruise lines
market their private islands as the true Caribbean experience and include them in
cruise itineraries. This development is of particular concern to regular destination
ports because it effectively means the cancellation of their ports whenever the
option of calling at a private island is exercised (Robertsen, "n.d."). Cruise lines
have implicitly refuted this argument by explaining that it had become increasingly
difficult marketing the same ports over and over again and in finding new ports of
call. It was thus their responsibility to stimulate the creation of new Caribbean ports
by way of investment in private islands (Peisley, 2006).
5.2.3

Market representation

Section 3.4 of Chapter 3 introduced the Florida Caribbean Cruise Association
(FCCA) and the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) as representative
associations for the cruise lines.

The importance of cruising to the Caribbean

(Peisley, 2006) became manifested during post 9/11 when in relation to land tourism
which fell from 17.2 million in 2000 to 16.1 million in 2002; the number of cruisers
steadily increased. This trend is illustrated in Figure 6, on page 11 of Chapter 2.

Notwithstanding the above and in keeping with views expressed by ECLAC (2005),
neither Caribbean governments nor Caribbean port authorities have seen it
necessary to establish a regional cruise port association. The Caribbean Tourism
Organisation
24

24

(CTO) was established in January 1989. Its primary objective is to

Detailed information can be obtained from http://www.caricom.org/jsp/archives/agreement-cto.htm
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provide to, and through its members, the services and information necessary for the
development of sustainable tourism leading to the economic and social benefit of
the Caribbean. Essentially the CTO can and should be regarded as the official
negotiating agency of destination ports.

However, and according to a senior official at Trinidad & Tobago’s Ministry of
Tourism, most destinations prefer to do their own negotiations on the premise that
this will generate more vessel calls, higher visitor arrivals and thus high economic
returns. This practice is detrimental to the region and weakens significantly any
effective representation, which the CTO can provide. Therefore, by showing a
preference to individualistic representation rather than collective bargaining,
destination ports effectively transfers the balance of power to cruise operators.
5.2.4

Cooperation among destination ports

Reference is made to Section 5.2.1 where the issue of the US$15 head tax in 1993
was discussed. It should be borne in mind that the Caribbean, within only one week,
yielded to the wishes of cruise operators and refrained from implementing the
agreed upon tax. A general lack of cooperation was thus displayed at a time when
Cozumel was the only Mexican port to be actively engaged in cruise tourism and the
globalization of the Caribbean cruise experience was still in its infancy stages. The
Caribbean thus had the capacity in 1993 to insist on the implementation of the tax or
negotiate an amount higher than the US$5 which currently exists.

Pinnock, Saltibus, Joseph and Benjamin strongly supported the view that the
intense level of competition for cruise tourism revenues at times could lead to
mutual distrust and lack of cooperation among regional states. This lack of
cooperation and individualism was seen to further erode the negotiating power of
destination ports and create situations, which may make it easier for them to be
manipulated by cruise operators. According to Benjamin, “a chain is as strong as its
weakest link, united we’ll stand but divided we’ll fall” (D. Saltibus; F. Pinnock; G.
Benjamin; & L. Joseph, personal communications, July 12-18, 2007).
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5.2.5

Dependence of destination ports on cruise tourism

The Caribbean nations should never forget the name Las Casas de Bartolomé for it
was his actions that marked the beginning of the dependency syndrome that
characterizes the Caribbean’s economy. The high economic returns of sugar cane
resulted in Las Casas convincing the King of Spain to order all available land to be
used for sugar cultivation, and foods imported (Williams, 1970).
Until the mid-20th century, the Caribbean relied heavily on its agricultural based
economy, but when this was undermined by globalization, it diversified into tourism
and became just as dependent on a tourism-based economy. The Caribbean, it is
argued is at least four times more dependent on tourism than any other region in the
world (King, LeBlanc, & Lowe, 2000; Williams, 1970).

Wilmsmeier (2006) agrees that the Caribbean is highly dependent on tourism and
claims that this sector makes a contribution of 30 percent to 50 percent of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of most Caribbean islands. Wilmsmeier singles out Antigua
& Barbuda, and the Bahamas as destinations where tourism contributes 74 percent
to 89 percent of GDP respectively. Fish and Gunther, (as cited in Seidl, Guiliano, &
Pratt, 2006) explain that this situation makes the local economy dependent upon the
economic conditions of international consumers and on the global economic
opportunities available to the cruise ship industry, rather than local economic
conditions.
5.3

Ship as a Destination

Cruise operators have adopted a strategy of defining land-based resorts such as
Orlando and Las Vegas as their competitors and thus design, promote and market
their vessels as resort destinations. Destination ports, which were once the main
attraction, are now seen as “extras along the way” since the vessel itself is the
destination, which sells the cruise. Interestingly, the concept destinational cruising
has now emerged to describe the situation whereby the ports and their attractions
are central to the cruise. Coincidentally, this aspect of cruising is regarded as niche
marketing (Cartwright & Baird, 1999; Robertsen, "n.d.").
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According to Cartwright & Baird (1999) only one-third of the people who take a
holiday take a cruise and cruise companies, realising this, decided to get the
remainder onboard. This was achieved by building mega vessels, revolutionizing the
work processes onboard through automation, and using the latest technologies for
vessel propulsion. The resulting economies of scale and improvements in efficiency,
lowered operational costs and generally made cruising more affordable for a wider
cross section of the society. Additionally, the available space in the now larger
vessels, made it possible to include a range of attractions, such as ice-skating rinks,
rock-climbing walls, boxing rings, surf pools, golf simulators, and multi-room villas
with private pools and in-suite Jacuzzis (Mathisen, 2005; http://www.f-cca.com).

The many innovative facilities and amenities provided onboard served the dual
purpose of making cruise vessels an alternative to land-based resorts and gave
passengers more opportunities to spend onboard. McKee and Mamoozadeh, (as
cited in Seidl, Guiliano, & Pratt, 2006) explained that by marketing the ship as a
destination, cruise operators sought to maximize the time (and money) cruisers
spent onboard and minimize the time spent in port. This view is supported by
Wilmsmeier (2006), who further explained that with depressed pricing, cruise
operators combined strategies for increasing onboard revenue with strategies for
decreasing costs. This, Wilmsmeier argued, was disadvantageous to port cities,
since passengers after spending onboard the ship had less money to spend ashore.
5.4

High Costs of Infrastructural Development

Infrastructural developments, in particular those related to ports, are usually very
costly. In most instances, governments, already under strict budgetary constrains,
give concessions to taxi and tour operators to help stimulate investments for cruise
tourism. This view is shared by Peisley (2006, p. 198) who added that governments
must give incentives to private companies to justify the extra investment to expand
and improve their fleet. The seasonality of the cruise industry, in addition to the
absence of any guaranteed calls from cruise vessels make private investors regard
port investments as high risk business ventures. This negative perception has been
reinforced by ports investing substantially in their facilities only to have suffered
severe loss of cruise business following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US. This
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was evident in the general movement towards the Western Caribbean, the Mexican
ports to be more exact.

In some instances cruise lines indicate a willingness to partner with destination ports
to either upgrade berths or construct new cruise facilities. However, their demands
are sometimes unreasonable in nature and this will be illustrated by the following
examples given of Belize and Jamaica in the Western Caribbean.

In 2004 Carnival Cruise Lines (CCL) negotiated directly with Belizean Prime Minister
Said Musa to construct the country’s first berthing facility at a cost of US$50 million.
The pier, which would accommodate two vessels, would eliminate the need for
tendering. The company guaranteed vessel calls for the next twenty five years and
effectively assured the generation of US$ 2 billion in revenues for the country.
However, since the contract was negotiated without any input from the Cabinet of
Ministers or tourism regulatory agencies, it soon came under public scrutiny. An
examination of the proposed contract revealed that CCL was entitled to exemptions
from all taxes and duties, protected against new or increases in existing fees, and
subject to no more than 3% increases in passenger head taxes after 2010.
Additionally, Section 7 of the contract actually gave CCL the authority to override
any law, policy or regulation which was enacted to limit the number of passengers
who came ashore. To date, as was seen in Section 5.1.1, Belize still does not have
any berthing facilities which lead to the conclusion that the contract was rejected
based on its bias towards CCL (CESD, 2006, pp. 36-40).

The case of Jamaica involved Reynolds’ Pier, a multi-purpose port in Ocho Rios,
which is used for cruise shipping as well as for the export of sugar and limestone.
Cruise lines, having expressed concerns about the size of the port, indicated that
Jamaica had lost over 200 calls in 2006 and the opportunity of realising almost
US$5 billion in revenues. The cruise lines, therefore, called for Reynolds’ Pier to be
converted to a tourism-only port and even offered to contribute towards the project if
the expansion was approved (Davis, 2006).

55

The owners of the Pier, Jamaica Bauxite Mining (JBM), pledged their support
towards expanding the facility to accommodate more cruise ships on condition that
cruise shipping coexist with other commercial activities at Reynolds’ Pier. Faced
with resistance from JMB, cruise operator RCCL hinted to the possibilities of
Freedom of the Seas being diverted to Montego Bay if Ocho Rios could not put
measures in placed to show its commitment towards cruise tourism. This strategy of
playing ports against each other is at times used by cruise operators to get
destination ports to comply with their demands; in most instances they do comply
(Davis, 2006).
5.5

Chapter Analysis

The island states of the Eastern, South and Deep Caribbean are among the
smallest in the world. As previously mentioned, these islands are heavily dependent
on foreign capital and on the economic purchasing power of international customers.
This is readily seen from the economic decline experienced by most regional states
in the aftermath of 9/11 and the recessionary effect that attack had on the US
economy. This economic situation is made worse with many Caribbean islands lying
directly in the path of hurricanes and other adverse weather systems originating
from Africa. These tropical disturbances bring torrential rains and extremely powerful
winds which often leave a trail of damage and destruction. Experts have claimed
that the severity of storms is expected to increase due to the occurrence of climate
change (Sullivan, 2005).
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Table 10: Total External Debt of selected CARICOM states, 1995-2004 (Year-end balance, in $US Millions)
COUNTRIES

1995

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Bahamas
Western Caribbean
Belize
Jamaica
Eastern Caribbean
Antigua
St. Kitts & Nevis
South Caribbean
Barbados
Dominica
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
Deep Caribbean
Grenada
Trinidad & Tobago

305.0

349.0

328.0

309.0

362.0

343.0

…
….

433.7
3375.0

486.6
4146.0

574.5
4348.0

749.7
4192.0

841.0
5120.0

286.8
54.1

471.8
161.5

496.1
205.8

540.9
261.1

575.8
367.1

335.1
321.9

479.0
103.0
87.5

605.0
153.5
159.8

539.0
181.3
169.5

755.0
208.6
169.7

737.0
229.5
192.3

792.0
245.5
221.1

116.0

197.3

203.4

258.8

329.9

362.0

86.6
1876.0

134.7
1637.6

182.6
1665.9

320.7
1549.1

342.9
1553.0

409.5
1350.6

Source: http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/1/26531/LCG2311B_2.pdf

Destination Ports desirous of being on the itineraries of cruise vessels are expected
to have their ports in a state of readiness to accommodate the ever-increasing
vessel size in terms of berthing space, logistical requirements and related shore
attractions. Consideration must, however, be given to the ability of these destination
ports to invest large sums of money in infrastructural developments and being
severely restricted to effect cost recovery measures. Most destination ports are
island states with high levels of debt as illustrated in Table 10 which shows the total
external debt of selected CARICOM states for the period 1995 to 2004. The
combined costs of Royal Caribbean International’s three Freedom Class 25 vessels
which amount to US$2.16 billion can easily wipe out the total external debt of the
Bahamas, Antigua, St. Kitts & Nevis, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & the
Grenadines. From Table 10, the total external debt in 2004 of these islands amounts
to US$1.86 billion.

Undoubtedly the cruise industry generates income for destination ports and
contributes to their economies. However, the increasing size of vessels, high levels
of market concentration, substitutability of destinations, lack of cooperation leading
to poor market representation, the ship as a destination, heavy reliance on foreign
capital, and the strings attached to joint ventures all tend to increase the vulnerability
25

The construction costs of one Freedom Class vessel is US$720 Million (See Table 9 of Section 5.1)
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of destination ports. This high level of vulnerability appears to have placed the
balance of power squarely on the shoulders of cruise operators and put destination
ports in a position to be easily manipulated.
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6

Industry Analysis

The Caribbean, as indicated earlier, receives most of its cruise passengers from the
US. From the latter stages of 2006 into 2007 the major cruise operators have been
faced with slow US growth and a consequential drop in their net revenue yields. In
February 2007, Carnival Corporation (Fairplay, 2007b) indicated that full-year 2007
yields, after the necessary currency adjustments, would actually fall by 1-2 percent.
Faced with a 4.2 percent yield decline, RCCL chairman Richard Fain (as cited in
Miller, 2007a) disclosed that growth in the Caribbean had leveled off and would
most likely reach a plateau in 2008.

Normally, when faced with an economic downturn in the US, cruise companies use
the ‘trade-down effect’ to cushion the accompanying impacts. In that strategy (Miller,
2007b) if low-end consumers drop out, the middle market consumers would
normally replace them on cheaper cruises since they too, are expected to be
prudent with their spending. This theory is however invalidated if the middle market
is not affected in a similar manner to the lower stratum.

Research conducted by Tim Conder of AG Edwards (as cited in Fairplay, 2007a)
reveals that the Caribbean fall-off stems from a debt squeeze on lower demographic
US consumers. This tends to weaken the ‘trade-down effect’ and negatively impacts
the profitability of cruise operators as previously indicated. Conder is supported by
Morgan Stanley’s chief US economist Richard Berner who asserts that the
bifurcation of consumer spending in the US was fuelled by a growing income
inequality, a manufacturing mini-recession, and other housing issues. Berner posits
the view that this bifurcation developed over a period of time and would not end
soon (Miller, 2007e).
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6.1

Strategic Analysis of Cruise Operators

Faced with the situation with fewer Americans traveling to the Caribbean, major
cruise operators Carnival Corporation and RCCL are addressing the issue by
diversifying from the Caribbean into Europe. RCCL brands, as a means of
combating revenue loss in the Caribbean, have decided to sail 51 percent of berthday capacity in the Caribbean in 2007 as compared to 56 percent in 2006.

Alternatively, Carnival Cruise Lines, which has the highest Caribbean exposure and
hence the most vulnerable, is cushioned from the impacts by parent company
Carnival Corporation, which owns the most diversified and global brand portfolio.
Carnival has therefore added incremental tonnage in Europe and the US West
Coast, and plans on undertaking price reduction strategies as a means of bolstering
occupancy (Fairplay, 2007c; Miller, 2007a, 2007b, 2007e).

According to Hill & Jones (1998, pp. 77-78), companies in consolidated industries
are interdependent and the competitive action of one company may directly impact
on the market share of its rivals. If left unchecked, Hill & Jones believed that the
response of competitors could lead to a price war and thus constitute a major
challenge for all concerned. Cruise operators have displayed a strong desire to
avoid price wars and so compete on non-price factors such as advertising and
promotions, brand positioning, and product quality, functionality and design.

An example of this type of competition involves ship building and design. Carnival
Cruise Lines, which normally focus on sundecks, bars and restaurants, upgrade
vessels regularly with a great level of consistency being observed between one
generation and the next. Alternatively, Royal Caribbean International upgrades are
radically different from each other and introduce a wide array of innovations that are
normally considered revolutionary changes for the industry. Examples include iceskating rinks, rock climbing walls and surf flowriders (Miller, 2007c).

The risk of potential competitors entering the market is severely restricted by cruise
operators who resort to building strong brand loyalty, using economies of scale to
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reduce operational costs, and the internal transfer of assets. American cruisers have
displayed a preference for new vessels and the major cruise operators, being very
customer oriented, strive to meet that expressed wish. In the early years of cruising,
old tonnage which was removed from the North American market was normally
placed on the Sale and Purchase Markets where potential competitors could easily
purchase well-maintained vessels. Today, this policy has changed and older
tonnage is now transferred to global brands thus making it extremely difficult for new
companies to get attractive second tonnage (Miller, 2007d).

Cruise operators, constantly search for opportunities to achieve cost minimization
and the trend from the late 90’s onwards has been to diversify and invest in
destination ports as well as the acquisition of their own islands. Berths as well as
shopping facilities are constructed in destination ports, and guaranteed calls are
given in exchange for rebates on head tax and other concessions. Cost savings are
also realized when vessels are built and equipped with Azipod propulsion systems
thus allowing high levels of maneuverability. This drastically reduces the reliance on
tugs and, consequently towage, expense.

Cruise operators have been able to boost their revenue generating capacity by
innovatively designing vessels to be destinations offering the same and sometimes
more amenities than land-based hotels. Sale of land tours are done onboard and the
needs of children as well as special interest groups, such as the disabled, are
meticulously attended to. Unlike in the past when children were seen as distractions
the trend today is to encourage families to bring them along (Speares, 2007).

Land tours are seen as a major revenue stream for cruise operators who reap huge
rewards without having to make any investment in that venture. Cruise lines sell
tours onboard to cruisers and charge a substantial mark up of almost 50 percent of
what attains ashore. Additionally, local tour operators are offered ‘preferred’ status
in exchange for sometimes 40 percent of their gross sales (Seidl, Guiliano, & Pratt,
2006).
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In a new spirit of cooperation with destination ports, cruise operators, through the
FCCA have introduced the Freestay Caribbean Cruise Conversion Programme
(FCCCP). This programme is geared towards enticing cruisers to return for longer
vacations at participating destinations.

FCCCP is currently running in Antigua,

Barbados, Belize, Cozumel, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St.
Maarten, and the US Virgin Islands. Also, the FCCA, for the past 12 years, has been
running a children’s essay contest which is aimed at two categories of children; a
junior division for those aged 12 and below and a senior division of ages 13-16
years. Cruise operators thru the FCCA build awareness and acceptance in the
region by tackling those most likely to bring about future change. The topic for 2006
was “Why Should Your Destination be on a Cruise Ships’ Itinerary?” (Peisley, 2006;
http://www.f-cca.com)
6.2

Strategic Analysis of Destination Ports

The majority of CARICOM nations are small developing states with limited land
space, little economic and human resources, and largely dependent on their tourism
sectors. In the past, the region’s agricultural produce received preferential access to
the European Market and many donor agencies provided aid in the form of grants
and other non-monetary methods. However, as alluded to in Section 2.2, the
preferential market access was ruled against by the WTO and currently, foreign aid
flows to the region have declined substantially. It is believed that donor agencies
have shifted focus to the war torn regions of Africa and the Middle East that are in
more critical need of aid than the Caribbean. The apparently strong correlation
between economic conditions in source markets and the purchasing power of
cruisers places the region in a very vulnerable position, especially with tourism being
a major GDP contributor (Caribbean Tourism Organization, 2007).

CARICOM, being placed in such a vulnerable position and having lost considerable
market share to the Western Caribbean, at times makes decisions that may not be
in its long term interests. One pertinent example is that of the region, according to
Saltibus, having the capacity to monitor cruise vessels, but deliberately
circumventing that task. A number of CARICOM nationals have attended the World
Maritime University and have been adequately equipped with the knowledge, skills,
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and abilities required for conducting effective port state control surveys. However,
surveyors are not given the finance nor the power to perform their tasks for fear that
a particular island may be regarded as being too strict and thus removed from future
itineraries (D. Saltibus, personal communication, July 15, 2007).
The Caribbean Environmental Health Institute (CEHI) was conceptualized in 1979
by CARICOM’s Health Ministers and became a legal entity in 1988. The Institute
was established to address environmental health concerns of the English-speaking
Caribbean but to date has not undertaken any research related to cruise tourism
and its environmental impact. This shortcoming of CEHI, and by extension
CARICOM, happens at a time when the trend is to build mega vessels, which
progressively bring more cruisers who, of course, generate more wastes. The
Caribbean Tourism Organization (2007) did research revealing that the number of
cruisers steadily increased from 36 percent of total tourist arrivals in 1980 to 48
percent in 2004. This substantiates the growing importance of cruise tourism to the
region and the potential risks that may be posed to the marine environment as well
as to land based resources (http://www.cehi.org.lc/aboutus.htm; CEHI, personal
communication, June 8, 2007).
There has been a general apathy towards environmental concerns in CARICOM
with destination ports being more concerned with economic gain. The very
environmental levy charged to cruise vessels and which should be used to
undertake research or to help mitigate against environmental degradation at
attraction sites is not used for that purpose. Paragraph 3 of page 37 indicates that in
most cases the revenues generated by the environmental levy are placed in
governments’ consolidated fund. Saltibus posits the view that undertaking cruise
ship environmental impact studies may be costly and thus are not undertaken by
regional states. However, he strongly believes that if those states were not so laid
back and had taken advantage of grant funds available in the past, then they would
have been more informed about their ports and the environmental impacts of cruise
vessels (D. Saltibus, personal communication, July 15, 2007).

Positions of dominance may at times lead to complacency and result in loss of
market share. This is readily apparent if cognizance is not taken of demographic
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changes within customer groupings or the strategies of potential and existing
competitors. Example is given of the West Indies Cricket Team, which, for several
years dominated world cricket and for many, playing cricket was seen as an activity,
which came naturally to West Indians. Whilst the West Indies were being
complacent, their competitors saw cricket as a science and developed special
institutions to improve their playing skills. This strategy worked, because today, the
West Indies no longer dominates world cricket. Similarities exist between cricket and
tourism with some destinations ports having a complacent attitude and thinking that
the natural resources of sun, sea, and sand will always be the most sought after
attributes of vacationers.

Today, though the Caribbean maintains the accolade of most preferred cruise
destination, high levels of complacency still exist. Examples to substantiate this
include, but are not limited to, the following:
•

Mass production of souvenirs sold throughout the region with the only
differentiating factor being the name of destination ports;

•

Continued reliance on the North American market and the marketing efforts
of cruise operators to get more Americans onboard their ships (paragraph 2,
Section 5.3, p.48);

•

Reliance on the FCCA to provide guidance on meeting the needs of the
cruise industry rather than supplement the information obtained with
research that should be undertaken by the Caribbean Tourism Organization.
Irrespective of how helpful the FCCA may be, the fact still remains that it’s
the representative agency of cruise operators and will first serve the interests
of its members before that of destination ports.

Cruise operators are transferring capacity away from the Caribbean to Europe and
this is expected to reduce the Caribbean’s lower berth capacity from 5.8 million in
2007 to 5.5 million in 2008. Destination ports, though aware of this development are
investing heavily in their facilities to accommodate increasingly larger vessels. This
is a risky venture but since economies of scale generated by mega vessels makes it
cheaper to cruise; regional ports want to be in a state of readiness to benefit from
the flow of passengers if and when they should occur.
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7

7.1

Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

This dissertation had five key objectives and research was therefore undertaken
with a view to obtaining information, some more detailed than others to better
understand cruise tourism in the Caribbean and to (1) determine and evaluate the
economic impact of cruise tourism in the Caribbean; (2) to ascertain the balance of
power between cruise operators and destination ports; (3) to evaluate the capacity
of destination ports to accommodate future mega-sized cruise vessels; (4) to
determine the economic and operational implications to liner shipping, of the priority
berthing given to cruise vessels; and (5) are destination ports meeting their
obligations as mandated by MARPOL 73/78 and providing port reception facilities
for ship-generated wastes?

In determining and evaluating the economic impact of cruise tourism on destination
ports, research revealed that the vessel, passengers and crew onboard all
generated revenues for destination ports.

In the cruise year 2005-2006, cruise

tourism contributed US$1.77 billion to the economies of 19 destination ports with
13.7 million passengers spending US$1.3 billion, 2.6 million crew spent US$194
million, and cruise line expenditure amounting to US$267 million. On the whole,
24,540 direct jobs and 16,960 indirect jobs were created from the US$1.77 billion
generated within the 19 destination ports.

A closer analysis however reveals that the economic impact of cruise tourism on
destination ports is significantly reduced by marketing strategies of cruise operators,
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and high levels of competition among destination ports. A current situation which will
have dire future consequences for destination ports is that of technological
advancements which enhance the manoeuvrability of modern vessels. To begin with,
when cruise vessels are marketed as destinations in themselves, this significantly
reduces the purchasing power of cruisers when venturing ashore since money is
also being spent onboard. Another factor which puts downward pressure on the
positive economic impacts of cruise tourism is the intense competition between
destination ports, which often results in ports charging very low fees for their
services. This lack of co-operation among destination ports adversely affects their
earning capacity and places them in vulnerable positions where they may be
exploited by cruise operators into giving absurd concessions to be placed on
itineraries.

Finally, the Azipod propulsion systems installed onboard recently built cruise vessels
may enhance manoeuvrability to the point that tugs are not needed and cost savings
thus realised. However, with Azipods, the propeller, rather than being on a fixed
shaft and facing away from the vessel’s stern now has the ability to rotate 360°.
This means that to move a mega-sized vessel away from a berth the propeller must
be placed at right angles to the vessel’s stern, then considerable power must be
applied in order to effect movement away from the berth. This seriously undermines
berth foundations and in the near future may pose considerable challenges for
destination ports and erode the gains made from cruise tourism.

The balance of power is without doubt in the hands of cruise operators and to really
appreciate the amount of power wielded by these operators due cognizance must
be given to the situation which unfolds in Table 11.
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Table 11: Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) for cruise operators for the period 1996 & 2005
Operators
CC
RCI
P&O Princess plc
NCL
Celebrity
Costa Crociere
Cunard
Seabourn
Others

Capacity
33992.0
18930.0
16704.0
8908.0
8278.0
7755.0
3500.0
477.0
120.0
98664.0

1996
%
34.5
19.2
16.9
9.0
8.4
7.9
3.5
0.5
0.0
100.0%

Operators
H
1190
369
286
81
71
62
12
0
0
2071

CC
RCCL
Star Group
Others
Others
Others

Capacity
137025
62246
27316
7552.9
7552.9
7552.9

2005
%
55
25
11
3
3
3

H
3025
625
121
9
9
9

Total
249245.7 100.0%
3798
Source: Data taken from G.P. Wild (International) Limited 2006, Cruise Industry News 2005, WTO,
2003 and the HHI concept from Cariou, 2007

According to the DOJ’s 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (as cited in Cariou, 2007)
a market in which the HHI is:
•

below 1000 is “un-concentrated”

•

between 1000 and 1800 is “moderately concentrated”

•

and above 1800 is “highly concentrated”.

In 1996 (Table 11) the HHI was 2068 and the cruise sector at that time was already
considered to be highly concentrated. Nine years later, after a spate of mergers and
acquisitions, the HHI was calculated to be 3794. This “extreme” level of
concentration, substitutability of destinations, trend of marketing the ship as a
destination, and the heavy reliance on foreign capital have all contributed to the
current vulnerability of destination ports. It has been found that this vulnerability has
led to situations whereby cruise operators play islands against each other and
display a willingness (case of Grenada in 1993)

to remove islands from their

itineraries if the line is not towed.

Though the economic status of small island developing states necessitates some
form of foreign injection of capital, destination ports are practically to be blamed for
the current state of affairs. Rather than co-operate and move forward as a cohesive
group, utilizing regional agencies such as the Caribbean Tourism organisation,
CARICOM states all compete with each other to be the preferred destination on
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cruise itineraries. The practice of relying on agencies of cruise operators to market
their destinations further deepens the dependency syndrome, to the extent that the
industry is being developed to suit the interests of cruise operators.

On the whole, marketing strategies such as the Freestay Caribbean Cruise
Conversion Programme and the children’s essay contest may be viewed as a
means of subtly gaining widespread acceptance for the policies of cruise operators
and thus reinforcing their power.

With regards to the capacity to accommodate mega-sized cruise vessels in the
future, it was found that most destinations had that capacity. This assertion is being
made because in the past when berthing infrastructure and water depth were largely
inadequate, cruise vessels berthed at the anchorage and used tenders to transfer
passengers from ship to shore and back. However, though there is no limit to the
size of vessel a destination port can receive, there are limitations to the size that can
be accommodated alongside a physical berth.

Destination ports such as Belize and the Cayman Islands continue to operate as in
previous times and still do not have any physical berthing structures. Yet, these
ports have such a high intrinsic value, that vessels go to the anchorage and tender
ashore. St. Maarten is no exception and during the peak of the cruise season may
have as many as six to nine cruise vessels call a day. The point that must be
highlighted is that St. Maarten can only accommodate alongside three (3) Voyage
Class vessels.

The three main drawbacks to berthing at the anchorage are the logistical headache
of getting all passengers ashore in time for their shore excursions, the likelihood of
the seas being choppy resulting in a not too comfortable time for tendering, and
preference given to passengers rather than crew in going ashore. As discussed
earlier, crew expenditure is a potential source of revenue to destination ports and
when the numbers going ashore lessen so does their economic contribution.
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Worldwide, it is the norm to give priority berthing to cruise vessels and in small ports
with multipurpose berths the effects of this policy is more readily apparent.
Research revealed that it was common practice for liner trades to either spend
several hours at the anchorage waiting for cruise vessels to sail or adjust their
arrival times to coincide with their departures. This situation has been in existence
for so many years that it can safely be asserted that liner trades in the Caribbean,
especially during the cruise season do not operate as per industry standards.

It is of significance to mention that Port Authorities operate on a 24-hour basis and
therefore regard night operations as the most practicable alternative available to
liner shipping. In most cases, if cruise vessels are expected the following day,
container vessels are expected to vacate berths at a specific time irrespective of
whether operations are completed or not. When faced with such choices preference
is not always given to loading empty containers and the end result is often high
levels of congestion in container yards. Port Authorities do not always consider the
monetary costs associated with increased waiting time, working at nights during
overtime hours, or even their congested yards.

The economic implications of the priority berthing given to cruise vessels are felt
through out the economy and is reflected in the prices of consumer and producer
goods. This is so because the additional costs incurred when working at nights and
the extra surcharge levied by vessel owners and associations, due to long delay in
berthing, is often passed on to the final consumer.

The final objective sought to determine whether destination ports were, as per
Regulation 12 (1) of Annex I, Regulation 10 (1) of Annex IV, and Regulation 7 (1) of
Annex V of MARPOL 73/78, meeting their obligations and providing port reception
facilities for ship-generated wastes. Research revealed that the Convention
designating the Wider Caribbean region as a Special Area has to date, not taken
effect because of the failure of Caribbean states to provide port reception facilities.
Reasons for the current situation were not obtained. However, it can reasonably be
assumed that cost implications and lack of regional commitment towards
environmental protection are possible reasons for this shortfall.
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7.2

Recommendations

The individualistic behaviour, the burning desire to make money irrespective of
environmental costs, and the lack of co-operation among destination ports is the
root of all issues facing destination ports in CARICOM. In light of this, the CSME
has been identified as the tool which must be used to remedy the regional ills
mentioned above. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramus which established the
CSME also gave birth to the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) and gave the CCJ
exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction in interpreting and applying the provisions of
the Treaty.

In light of this, the CCJ should be regarded as the central agency

empowered to take legal action against member state found guilty of breaching of
legislation.

In that regard, a CSME with the regulatory powers similar to the

European Commission should seek to implement the following recommendations:
7.2.1

Formation of tourism/agriculture linkages

The Caribbean’s very fertile agricultural soils should be used to develop synergies
between agriculture and tourism. Rather than viewing taxes as the only means to
increase revenues, linkages between agriculture and tourism should be seen as an
alternative form of revenue generation. With such a linkage, fruits, crops and
vegetables can be grown and sold to cruise vessels thus lessening the high farmerunemployment levels which resulted from the WTO ruling mentioned in Section 2.2
on page 2. This will reduce the high dependence on cruise tourism since land-based
resorts can also be partners in this enterprise.
7.2.2

Employment of Caribbean nationals

The Caribbean, by virtue of being actively involved in land-based tourism for several
years, has a pool of workers who are trained to perform a variety of tourism related
functions.

Considering that cruise operators are always seeking to minimize

operational costs, the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) should
approach cruise operators with an employment proposal for regional tourism
workers, highlighting the extremely low repatriating costs of CARICOM nationals in
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comparison to other nationalities. The Caribbean Maritime Institute should be
utilized to provide the requisite level of maritime training to shore-based tourism
workers to facilitate their employment onboard cruise vessels.
7.2.3

Development of a cruise ship policy

A cruise ship policy should be developed to address the variances in passenger
taxes, and the adhoc arrangements made for the collection, transportation and
disposal of ship-generated wastes. Apart from this, the scheduling of vessel calls 26
and over-crowding of shore attraction sites should be attended to with some level of
urgency. This policy should therefore incorporate a movement geared towards
developing an ecotourism based industry where cruise operators and destination
ports alike will develop sound environmental practices for a sustainable tourism
product. Decisions on the location and number of port reception facilities must be
made as well as the selection of the most feasible cost recovery methods.

7.2.4

Product differentiation

There is a critical need to focus more on factors which differentiate islands from
each other and emphasize these differences. Sea, sun, and sand should always be
used to market the region but due regard should be taken of the changing
demography of cruisers who may be looking for more than the traditional attractions.
Example is given of the development and growth of Alaska as a cruise destination,
one which is radically different from the Caribbean in every respect. In that regard,
innovative ways should be developed to highlight the Caribbean’s rich and colourful
history. For example, empty army barracks and a little imagination could be used to
recreate the atmosphere that prevailed during the times when the world’s super
powers fought relentlessly for control over this small chain of islands.

26

At times, five or more vessels may call at a port on one week day whilst other days may only have
as little as one or two.
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7.2.5

Strategic partnerships with cruise operators

Strategic partnerships with cruise operators should be pursued for investment in port
infrastructure, and innovative shore excursions should be developed-those with the
“wow” effect but with a “tropical twist”. Such partnerships will best serve as an
incentive for risk averse investors to invest in the industry and help alleviate the
quality, diversity, and sustainability of the region’s tourism product. The collective
negotiations will foster a more equitable exchange whereby destination ports will not
be at risk of being made worse off with draconian deals such as the one mentioned
in Section 5.4 on page 49 between Carnival Cruise Lines and Belize.

In this world of wars, genocides, and increasing acts of terror the serenity of the
Caribbean will always make the region a much sought after destination. The key
stakeholders in the industry, namely cruise operators and destination ports, have a
responsibility to develop in the Caribbean cruise industry in a sustainable manner to
facilitate the continuance of the industry as well as its long term profitability. Any
action contrary to this will ultimately result in cruise operators and destination ports
killing the goose that lay the golden egg.
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Appendix A-1: Carnival Corporation
Accounting Year End: 30 November
Item
Profit and Loss
Sales
Of which cruise
Profit before interest
Of which cruise operating profit
Net income
Income before tax
Exports
Non-operating income
Depreciation
Interest expense
Auditors fees
Director's emoluments
Employee pay
No. of employees
Balance Sheet
Tangible fixed assets
Of which ships
Intangible assets
Intermediate assets
Total Fixed Assets
Stocks
Trade debtors
Other current assets
Total Current Assets

2004 I

2003 I

9727000
9427000
2173000
2083000
1854000
1901000
n.a
-5000
812000
267000
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

6718000
6459000
1383000
1371000
1194000
1223000

20823000
22572000
3321000
1764000
25908000
240000
409000
1079000

2002

I

2001 I

2000

8000
585000
168000
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

4368269
4229124
1042059
1065797
1015941
959379
1075736
42011
382343
78600
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

4535751
4357942
1034635
0
926200
913343
1045388
34469
372224
120692
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

3778542
3578372
1007654
0
965458
966552
597875
-17500
287667
41372
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

17522000
18134000
3031000
1806000
22359000

10115404
10665958
681056
406236
11202696

8390230
8892412
651814
562520
9604564

8001318
8575563
701385
579135
9281838

171000
403000
1558000
2132000

91310
108327
932515
1132152

91996
90763
1776229
1958988

100451
95361
353670
549482

Total Assets

1728000
27636000

24491000

12334848

11563552

9831320

Trade creditors
Short term loans
Other current liabilities
Total Current Liabilities
TA Minus TCL

631000
1062000
3341000
5034000
22602000

645000
94000
2576000
3315000
21176000

268687
148642
1202477
1619806
10715042

269467
21764
1189009
1480240
10083312

332694
248219
1134381
1715294
8116026

Long term loans
Other UT liabilities
Total Capital & Reserves
Capital Employed

6291000
551000
15760000
22602000

6918000
465000
13793000
21176000

3011969
285170
7417903
10715042

2954854
537681
6590777
10083312

2099077
146332
5870617
8116026

Earnings Per Share ($)
Performance Analysis
Profitability Ratios
Return on Total Assets (%)
Return on Capital (%J
Pre-tax Profit Margin (%)
Return on Investment (%)
Return on Total Capital and Reserves (%)
Liquidity Ratios
Quick Ratio (Acid Test)
Current Ratio
Gearing Ratios
Equity Gearing (%)
Total Debt/ Net Worth (%)
Income Gearing (%)
Efficiency Ratios
Debtor Days Outstanding
Creditor Days
Stocks/ Sales (%)
Asset Utilisation
Working Capital/ Sales (%)
Sales/ Fixed Assets
Sales/ Capital Employed
Employee Performance
Pay/ Sales (%)
Profit/ Employee
Sales/ Employee
Capital Employed/ Employee
Fixed Assets/ Employee
Pay/ Employee

2.31

1.66

1.73

1.58

1.61

6.9
8.4
19.5
9.2
12.1

5.0
5.8
18.2
6.5
8.9

7.8
9.0
22.0
9.6
12.9

7.9
9.1
20.1
10.2
13.9

9.8
11.9
25.6
12.1
16.5

0.30
0.34

0.59
0.64

0.64
0.70

1.26
1.32

0.26
0.32

132.7
59.1
12.3

128.9
65.2
12.1

150.9
46.9
7.5

132.5
50.1
11.7

148.2
45.4
4.1

15
24
2.5
0.35
-33.99
0.47
0.43

22
35
2.5
0.27
-17.61
0.38
0.32

9
22
2.1
0.35
-11.16
0.43
0.41

7
22
2.0
0.39
10.55
0.54
0.45

9
32
2.7
0.38
-30.85
0.47
0.47

n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
na
n.a

n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

Source: G. P. Wild (International Limited from Company Annual Reports
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Year

2005

I

2004

$m
Revenue
Operating costs and expenses
Operating Profit Before Depredation & Amortization
Depredation & Amortization
Operating Income after D & A
Pre-Tax Income (EBT)
Net Income after tax
Income per share (basic)
Profit Margin

11,087
6,217
3,541
902
2,639
2,330
2,257
2.80
21.0

Source: G. P. Wild (International Limited from Company Annual Reports
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9,727
5,457
2,985
812
2,173
1,901
1,901
2.31
19.5

Appendix A-2: Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited

Accounting Year Ending: 31 December
Item
Profit and Loss
Sales
Profit before interest
Of which cruise operating profit
Net income
Income before tax
Exports
Non-operating income
Depreciation
Interest expense
Auditors fees
Director's emoluments
Employee pay
No. of employees
Balance Sheet
Tangible fixed assets
Of which ships
Intangible assets
Intermediate assets
Total Fixed Assets
Stocks
Trade debtors
Other current assets
Totat Current Assets
Total Assets

1

2004

2003

i

2002
$('000s)

J

2001

I

2000

4555375
784668
753589
474691
474691
694656
31079
394136
309977
n.a
n.a
487633
n.a

3784249
549062
526185
280664
280664
527260
22877
362695
268398
n.a
n.a
426462
n.a

3434347
618126
550975
351284
351284
466190
67151
339100
266842
n.a
n.a
314370
24500

3145250
507664
455605
254457
254457
n.a
52026
301174
253207
n.a
n.a
283919
24500

2865846
599691
569540
445363
445363
n.a
30151
231048
154328
n.a
n.a
0
20000

10193443
11056851
278561
631474
11103478
60260
84899
715447
860606
11964084

9943495
10536947
278561
526136
10748192
53277
89489
431784
574550
11322742

9276484
9404959
278561
535743
10090788
37299
79535
330909
447743
10538531

8605448
8289028
278561
598659
9482668
33493
72196
780425
886114
10368782

6831809
6168383
288974
396963
7517746
30115
53609
226995
310719
7828465

Trade creditors
Short term loans
Other current liabilities
Total Current Liabilities
TA Minus TCL

162973
905374
1205155
2273502
9690582

187756
315232
1001539
1504527
9818215

171153
122544
876236
1169933
9368598

144070
238581
729998
1112649
9256133

158143
109926
644311
912380
6916085

Long term loans
Other UT liabilities
Total Capital & Reserves
Capital Employed

4826570
59492
4804520
9690582

5520572
34746
4262897
9818215

5322294
11610
4034694
9368598

5407531
92018.
3756584
9256133

3300170
0
3615915
6916085

2.26

1A2

1.76

1.32

2.31

4.0
4.9'
10.4
7.4
9.9

2.5
2.9
7.4
5.4
6.6

3.3
3.7
10.2
6.5
8.7

2.5
2.7
8.1
5.3
6.8

5.7
6.4
15.5
8.5
12.3

0.35
0.38

0.35
0.38

0.35
0.38

0.77
0.80

0.31
0.34

67.1
126.6
39.5

60.4
146.5
48.9

62.0
145.0
43.2

56.8
162.3
49.9

85.8
102.5
25.7

7
13
1.3
0.38
-31.02
0.45_
0.47

9
18
1.4
0.33
-24.57
0.38
0.39

8
18
1.1
0.33,
-21.03
0.37
0.37

8
17
1.1
0.30
-7.20
0.37'
0.34

7
20
1.1
0.37
-20.99
0.42
0.41

10.70
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a,
n.a

11.27
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

9.15
14338
140177
382392
378632
12831

9.03
10386
128378
377801
351243
11589

0.00
22268
143292.
345804'
341590.
0

Earnings Per Share (UD$ diluted)
Performance Analysis
Profitability Ratios
Return on Total Assets (%)
Return on Capital (%)
Pre-tax Profit Margin (%)
Return on Investment (%)
Return on Total Capital and Reserves (%)
Liquidity Ratios
Quick Ratio (Acid Test)
Current Ratio
Gearing Ratios
Equity Gearing (%)
Total Debt/ Net Worth (%)
Income Gearing (%)
Efficiency Ratios
Debtor Days Outstanding
Creditor Days
Stocks/ Sales (%)
Asset Utilisation
Working Capital/ Sales (%)
'
Sales/ Fixed Assets
Sales/ Capital Employed
Employee Performance
Pay/ Sales (%)
Profit/ Employee
Sales/ Employee
Capital Emplo -d/ Em Jo -e
Fixed Assets/ Employee
Pay/ Employee

Source: G. P. Wild (International Limited from Company Annual Reports
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Year

2005

~
$
3,609,487
1,293,687
4,903,174
2,994,232
871,565
715,956
3.47
14.6

Passenger ticket revenues
Onboard and other revenues
Total revenues
Operating costs
Operating income
Net income
Earnings Per Share (Basic)
Assumed profit margin (%)

Source: G. P. Wild (International Limited from Company Annual Reports
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2004
$
3,359,201
1,196,174
4,555,375
2,819,383
753,589
474,691
2.39
10.4

Appendix A-3: Star Cruise Group
Accounting Year Ending: 31 December
Item

2004

I

2003

I

I

2002

2001

2000

$('000s)
Profit and Loss
Sales
Of which cruise
Profit before interest
Of which cruise operating profit
Net income
Income before tax
Exports
Non-operating income
Depreciation
Interest expense
Auditors fees
Director's emoluments
Employee pay
No. of employees
Balance Sheet
Tangible fixed assets
Of which ships
Intangible assets
Intermediate assets
Total Fixed Assets
Stocks
Trade debtors
Other current assets
Total Current Assets
Total Assets

1,636,405
1631439
120466
135465
-9006
-8035
0
-20935
181909
107566
995
6871
338159
n.a

1,618,208
1615724
-20496
79049
-124473
-122810
0
-8510
197349
93804
856
7809
306769
n.a

1,573,588
1,570,507
160,842
73406
50931
52,406
0
-9110
176166
99326
912
6,331
249,577
n.a

1,381,566
1,369,051
84,541
73406
-16043
-14,284
0
19667
154417
118492
1073
4,692
224,823
11,976

1,326,743
1,312,715
159,799
152306
-44000
-20,318
0
-180117
139929
0
858
4,648
206,898
n.a

3823302
3737811
605286
100780
4529368
42059
12089
401597
455745
4985113

3626873
13357000
621750
39839
4288462
38075
17423
452031
507529
4795991

3558448
3084361
609733
18052
4186233
40302
16,424
515,738
572464
4758697

3296768
3084361
626138
10664
3933570
32871
25,398
227,147
285416
4218986

2888148
2716491
639036
20512
3547696
28329
19,920
333,312
381561
3929257

Trade creditors
Short term loans
Other current liabilities
Total Current Liabilities
TA Minus TCL

83481
179159
483324
745964
4239149

98950
1074226
426538
1599714
3196277

108774
340,187
387,314
836275
3922422

109293
94,551
310,169
514013
3704973

76092
263,573
288,418
628083
3301174

Long term loans
Other UT liabilities
Total Capital & Reserves
Capital Employed
Earnings per share (basic, cents)
Performance Analysis
Profitability Ratios
Return on Total Assets (%)
Return on Capital (%)
Pre-tax Profit Margin (%)
Return on Investment (%)
Return on Total Capital and Reserves (%)
Liquidity Ratios
Quick Ratio (Acid Test)
Current Ratio
Gearing Ratios
Equity Gearing (%)
Total Debt/ Net Worth (%)
Income Gearing (%)
Efficiency Ratios
Debtor Days Outstanding
Creditor Days
Stocks/ Sales (%)
Asset Utilisation
Working Capital/ Sales (%)
Sales/ Fixed Assets
Sales/ Capital Employed
Employee Performance
Pay/ Sales (%)
Profit/ Employee
Sales/ Employee
Capital Employed/ Employee
Fixed Assets/ Employee
Pay/ Employee

2238904
186273
1813972
4239149
-0.17

1199567
188194
1808516
3196277
-2.51

2093838
9,054
1819530
3922422
n.a

2120564
10168
1574241
3704973
n.a

1696044
10193
1594937
3301174
n.a

-0.2
-0.2
-0.5
2.3
-0.4

-2.6
-3.8
-7.6
-0.7
-6.2

1.1
1.3
3.3
3.6
2.9

-0.3
-0.4
-1.0
2.7
-0.9

-0.5
-0.6
-1.5
-0.6
-1.3

0.55
0.61

0.29
0.32

0.64
0.68

0.49
0.56

0.56
0.61

57.2
200.1
89.3

70.8
166.4
-457.7

61.9
201.2
61.8

59.5
233.6
140.2

68.3
205.0
0.0

3
19
2.6
0.33
-17.74
0.43
0.39

4
22
2.4
0.34
-67.49
0.45
0.51

4
25
2.6
0.33
-16.76
0.44
0.40

7
29
2.4
0.33
-16.55
0.42
0.37

5
21
2.1
0.34
-18.58
0.46
0.40

20.66
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

18.96
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

15.86
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

16.27
-1193
115361
309366
275281
18773

15.59
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a

Source: G. P. Wild (International Limited from Company Annual Reports
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Year

2005
Q1 to Q3
$
1,443,186
974,335
131,963
46,122
43,613
0.82
32

Total revenues
Operating costs
Operating income
Pre-tax profit
Net income
Earnings Per Share (Basic)
Profit margin (%)

$
1,282,808
838,473
115,365
28,911
28,241
0.53
2.3

Source: G. P. Wild (International Limited from Company Annual Reports
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Appendix B: Break down of Cruise Tourism Expenditure by Segment, 2005-2006 Cruise Year

Destinations

Bahamas
Total
Bahamas

Total
Crew
Exp.**

Direct
Employee
Wage
Income

Indirect
Employee
Wage
Income

($US Millions)

($US Millions)

Total
Employee
Wage
Income

Totat
Crew
Onboard
(Thousands)

(Thousands)

96.0

799.4

279.8

5.6

42.8

144.4

2,235

1,730

3,965

34.3

26.6

60.9

1,585.5

96.0

799.4

279.8

5.6

42.8

144.4

2,235

1,730

3,965

34.3

26.6

60.9

Pax*
Onshore
Visits
(Thousands)

Total Pax
Expenditures

1,981.8

1,585.5

1,981.8

Totat Pax
Onboard
(Thousands)

($US Millions)

Crew
Onshore
Visits

($US
Millions)

Cruiseline
Exp.**

Total
Exp.**

($US
Millions)

($US
Millions)

Direct
Employment

Indirect
Employment

Total
Employment

Population

($US
Millions)

Belize
Cayman
Islands

726.6

610.4

53.6

288.6

72.1

1.3

9.3

64.2

1,215

670

1,885

300,000

12.9

7.0

19.9

1,857.2

1,671.5

138.3

747.7

261.7

12.0

29.4

179.7

2,090

1,615

3,705

23,800

37.2

28.8

66.0

Cozumel

40.8

2,142.3

1,713.9

157.0

891.0

356.4

17.4

39.5

213.9

3,715

2,230

5,945

25.4

15.4

Costa Maya

757.4

605.9

46.2

295.0

147.5

7.4

6.6

60.2

1,115

655

1,770

7.3

4.4

11.7

Key West

907.1

852.6

47.1

368.1

147.3

9.0

12.6

68.7

755

505

1,260

17.2

18.2

35.4

6,390.6

5,454.3

442.2

2,590.4

985.0

47.1

97.4

586.7

8,890

5,675

14,565

100.0

73.8

173.8

460.4

391.4

32.9

197.2

78.9

4.1

4.0

41.0

720

495

1,215

65,962

6.1

4.3

10.4

Puerto Rico
St. Kitts &
Nevis

1,296.5

1,186.6

115.0

509.6

203.9

18.6

36.4

170.0

2,225

1,640

3,865

3,522,037

30.4

25.0

55.4

117.2

93.8

5.4

48.8

19.5

0.4

0.9

6.7

125

80

205

42,291

0.9

0.6

1.5

St. Marteen
US Virgin
Islands
Total Eastern
Caribbean

1,449.2

1,304.3

189.3

724.5

289.8

46.2

10.9

246.4

3,210

2,380

5,590

61,967

57.0

42.3

99.3

1,812.8

1,631.5

288.3

703.0

351.5

50.6

22.7

361.6

3,525

2,640

6,165

101,809

77.7

57.9

135.6

Total Western
Caribbean
Antigua

5,136.1

4,607.6

630.9

2,183.1

943.6

119.9

74.9

825.7

9,805

7,235

17,040

172.1

130.1

302.2

Barbados

506.6

405.3

45.3

207.1

82.8

6.3

5.7

57.3

950

685

1,635

257,083

9.7

7.1

16.8

Dominica

223.5

190.0

9.7

88.5

35.4

2.6

1.5

13.8

255

135

390

71,183

1.9

1.1

3.0

Martinique
St. Lucia

91.1

77.5

3.0

46.9

18.8

0.5

0.5

4.0

70

45

115

363,031

0.5

0.3

0.8

432.2

345.7

28.6

190.7

76.3

2.4

3.8

34.8

685

350

1,035

152,335

4.5

2.2

6.7

1,253.4

1,018.5

86.6

533.2

213.3

11.8

11.5

109.9

1,960

1,215

3,175

16.6

10.7

27.3

563.1

478.6

54.2

223.9

89.6

7.0

5.0

66.2

985

725

1,710

14.1

10.5

24.6

38.1

32.4

3.7

17.2

5.2

0.2

0.6

4.5

95

45

140

0.5

0.3

0.8

Curacao

298.5

253.8

13.5

120.3

42.1

1.6

2.9

18.0

250

170

420

143,816

4.4

3.1

7.5

Grenada
Total Deep
Caribbean

289.6

246.2

13.2

125.0

50.0

1.3

1.8

16.3

320

165

485

96,600

2.1

1.0

3.1

1,189.3

1,011.0

84.6

486.4

186.9

10.1

10.3

105.0

1,650

1,105

2,755

21.1

14.9

36.0

15,951.2

13,676.9

$1,340.3

6,592.5

2,608.6

$194.5

$236.9

$1,771.7

24,540.0

16,960.0

41,500.0

$344.10

$256.10

$600.2

Total South’n
Caribbean
Aruba
Cartagena

Totals

Source: Own compilation from Wild, 2006,WTO, 2003; Moonie et al, 1998; Cruise Industry News, 2005
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65,100

83

